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REPORT
TO THE
BOARD OF SUPERVISORS
OF THE
CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO


REVIEW OF THE OPERATIONS
OF THE
SAN FRANCISCO POLICE DEPARTMENT
(Part II)

BUDGET ANALYST
FOR THE
SAN FRANCISCO BOARD OF SUPERVISORS
MAY, 1980

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OF SAN FRANCISCO

BOARD OF SUPERVISORS

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May 21, 1980

Honorable Louise Renne and Ella Hill Hutch
Chairs and Members of the Finance Committee
and Fire, Safety and Police Committee
Board of Supervisors
Room 235, City Hall
San Francisco, CA 94102


Dear Madam Chairs and Members:

Transmitted herewith is the Budget Analyst's management audit report (Part II) on the San Francisco Police Department. This report deals primarily with the investigative, traffic and personnel functions of the police department. The recommendations that we have made would alter procedures now in use by the police department for conducting investigations, controlling traffic, classifying and paying police trainees, staffing the emergency communications center, allocating overtime and vacation leave, and conducting investigations of complaints against police department personnel. Implementation of these recommendations would improve the provision of police services, save approximately \$2.1 million annually plus a one-time saving of at least \$367,000 from the current cost of police services, and provide additional revenues to the City and County of approximately \$1.6 million annually. The net financial benefits to the City and County as a result of the implementation of these recommendations would be approximately \$3.7 million annually plus a one time saving of at least \$367,000. In order to achieve all of this financial benefit immediately, the consent decree issued by the U.S. District Court for Northern California requiring the authorization of 1,971 police officer positions for the San Francisco Police Department would have to be modified. Without such modification, approximately \$1.3 million of the projected annual savings would not be available until the 1984-85 fiscal year.

Honorable Louise Renne and Ella Hill Hutch
Chairs and Members of the Finance Committee
and Fire, Safety and Police Committee
May 21, 1980
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The administration of the Police Department and members of the Police Commission have had the opportunity to review and comment on this report. The written response from the department is attached at the end of our report.

Respectfully submitted,



Harvey M. Rose

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Supervisor Walker
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Supervisor Bardis
Supervisor Britt
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Rudy Nothenberg
Police Commission
Chief of Police
District Attorney
Mayor's Criminal Justice Council
Controller

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This management audit of the San Francisco Police Department (SFPD) was performed at the request of the Board of Supervisors of the City and County of San Francisco. The management audit was conducted in two parts. The first part, which was issued in the spring of 1979, dealt primarily with the field operations (patrol) function. The second part, which is contained in this report, deals primarily with the investigative, traffic and personnel functions.

In conducting this management audit, we made use of a wide variety of informational sources. We reviewed the existing literature on the organization and operation of police departments in large metropolitan areas. We interviewed key personnel in other Bay Area police departments which operate under conditions similar to those in San Francisco. We analyzed previous studies which have been made of the San Francisco Police Department and appropriate sections of the San Francisco Charter. We reviewed rules and procedures adopted by the Police Commission and General Orders issued by the Chief of Police. We interviewed personnel at all levels and in all operating units of the San Francisco Police Department and simulated various aspects of police work where appropriate.

San Francisco is divided into nine police districts. Each district has a separate police station which is under the responsibility of a Police Captain. In the 1979-80 fiscal year, the SFPD has an authorized staffing level of 2,424 positions including 1,770 sworn police officer positions and 654 non-sworn "civilian" positions. The actual number of filled positions is much less than the number of authorized positions, however. As of January, 1980, the number of filled sworn police officer positions was 1,616 and the number of filled non-sworn positions was 564 for a total of 2,180 filled positions.

A nationwide survey of police practices in 50 metropolitan police departments shows that the San Francisco Police Department has a relatively high cost per capita, a relatively high number of authorized police positions per capita, a relatively high salary structure, relatively high retirement benefits, below average fringe benefits (other than retirement), relatively short time-in-service requirements for promotion eligibility, and a relatively high proportion of non-sworn positions compared to police officer positions. From this survey it appears that police services in San Francisco are relatively expensive when compared to the cost of such services in cities of a comparable size. However, on such measures as response time to calls for police services, arrest rates and clearance rates for reported crimes, the San Francisco Police Department does not demonstrate better performance than other comparable police departments.

In this management audit report, we have made recommendations which would alter procedures now in use by the Police Department for conducting investigations, controlling traffic, classifying and paying police trainees, staffing the emergency communications center, allocating overtime and vacation leave, and conducting investigations of complaints against police department personnel. Implementation of these recommendations would improve the provision of police services, save approximately \$2.1 million annually plus a one-time saving of at least \$367,000 from the current cost of police services, and provide additional revenues to the City and County of approximately \$1.6 million annually. The net financial benefit to the City and County as a result of the implementation of these recommendations would be approximately \$3.7 million annually plus a one-time saving of at least \$367,000. A summary of our findings and recommendations is as follows:

1. The assignment and use of investigative personnel is costly and inefficient. By transferring some investigative work from the Police Department to the District Attorney's Office and by reallocating investigative responsibilities, criminal investigations would be more efficient and a savings of approximately \$1.3 million annually could be realized. We found that:

- In San Francisco, both the Police Department and the District Attorney's Office have investigative personnel who prepare cases for prosecution.
- Only San Francisco and Los Angeles, among major California cities, have a special classification for investigative personnel. Investigations work in other cities is performed by personnel holding the rank of sergeant or police officer.
- The San Francisco Police Department does not have an investigations manual and provides investigative personnel with approximately one-third of the training provided to investigative personnel in the Los Angeles Police Department.
- SFPD investigative personnel spend approximately 50% of their time on rebookings (developing a case against an arrested suspect for review by the District Attorney).
- A recent study of criminal investigations has recommended that post-arrest investigations (rebookings) be assigned to the prosecutor's office.
- Because of differences in fringe benefits paid by the Police Department and the District's Attorney's Office, rebookings now performed by the Police Department could be performed by an equivalent number of investigative personnel in the District Attorney's Office at an annual savings of approximately \$1.3 million. These savings would not be available until the 1984-85 fiscal year unless the consent decree which requires the authorization of 1,971 police officer positions for the SFPD is modified.
- A recent study of criminal investigations concluded that preliminary investigations are far more critical than follow-up investigations for producing arrests. However, in the SFPD there is little contact between investigative personnel (who perform follow-up investigations) and patrol personnel (who perform preliminary investigations).

Based on these findings, we are making the following recommendations:

- That post-arrest investigations (rebookings) be transferred to the District Attorney's Office and that the City Attorney be requested to seek a modification of the consent decree which requires the authorization of 1,971 police officer positions for the SFPD.
- That the Board of Supervisors propose a Charter Amendment which would abolish the ranks of Inspector and Assistant Inspector as specified in Charter Sections 3.531 and 3.534.
- That all personnel holding the rank of Inspector be appointed as Sergeants.
- That all personnel holding the rank of Assistant Inspector be appointed as temporary Sergeants until they have served two years in an investigative capacity and/or as a patrol supervisor.
- That all persons taking the Lieutenant examination first take and pass the Sergeant examination.

- That preliminary investigations be expanded and enhanced by redeploying sergeant/inspectors to the district stations to perform and supervise preliminary investigations.
- That the SFPD develop an investigations manual.

2. The absence of performance standards for investigations work by SFPD personnel allows a wide range of performance in criminal investigations. We found that:

- The SFPD does not have performance standards for investigations work.
- The performance of individual Inspectors in the SFPD, as defined by cases assigned, arrests and clearances, varies widely even when investigations cover substantially the same type of crime.

Based on these findings we recommend that the SFPD develop individual performance standards for criminal investigations.

3. Modifications in the procedures for towing improperly parked and abandoned vehicles could produce additional revenue to the City estimated at approximately \$1.6 million annually and correct many of the problems which have characterized towing procedures during the past year. We found that:

- Under the policy of contracting for all towing and vehicle storage services, the City is likely to continue to experience the same problems which emerged under the previous contract. These problems include a lack of existing companies with proven experience in towing, storing and disposing of vehicles, and a difficulty in terminating a towing/storage contract when the contractor controls the storage area.
- By relying on a single firm to provide towing services on a City-wide basis, and by requiring that same firm to provide adequate storage facilities for towed vehicles, the City is placing itself in a non-competitive situation with regard to the towing contract.
- Three alternative storage sites for towed vehicles are available to the City.
- The City currently receives no revenue for allowing contract towing companies to tow improperly parked and abandoned vehicles.
- Increased fines and increased numbers of citations issued are as effective as the threat of towing for keeping the streets clear during commute hours.
- A \$15 increase in the current towaway zone parking citation and a \$5 surcharge added to the towing fee could increase revenues for the City and County by approximately \$1.6 million annually.

Based on these findings, we are making the following recommendations:

- That the City acquire a suitable storage site for towed vehicles and contract out the operation of this site with the same firm that holds the contract for towing abandoned vehicles.

- That the city contract with several neighborhood towing firms for the towing of improperly parked vehicles and for making miscellaneous tows.
- That the Police Department be authorized to establish priorities for those towaway zones where vehicles will be towed and those areas where vehicles will receive citations only.
- That the fine for parking in a towaway zone be increased from \$25 to \$40. (The Municipal Court judges adopted this increase on April 2, 1980).
- That a \$5 surcharge, payable to the City, be added for all tows authorized by the City.

4. A redeployment of personnel currently assigned to the Traffic Division would improve the efficiency of traffic control and would allow for the reassignment of sworn police officers to other duties. We found that:

- The ratio of supervisory to subordinate personnel in the Traffic Division is higher than the pattern for the rest of the San Francisco Police Department.
- Traffic enforcement and investigation duties have been increasingly assigned to the district stations.
- Parking control personnel are centralized at the Hall of Justice even though they cover beats throughout the City.

Based on these findings, we are making the following recommendations:

- That all parking control personnel be assigned to the district station with the closest proximity to their parking control beats, with supervision of these personnel to be provided by existing district station personnel.
- That the accident investigation function be assigned to district station personnel.
- That the motorcycle unit and special duty squad be placed under the Captain of the Crime Specific Task Force.
- That the hit-and-run investigative function be transferred to the District Attorney's Office for rebookings, or to the Investigations Bureau in cases where no arrest has been made.
- That two Captain positions in the Traffic Division be eliminated and that 23 sworn officers in the Traffic Division who are currently assigned primarily to administrative responsibilities be assigned to other duties.

5. By changing the rate of pay for police recruits to conform with rates of pay provided by other police departments, the City and County could realize an annual savings of at least \$73,900 and a one-time savings of at least \$367,000. Further savings of approximately \$200,000 annually could be realized by designating recruits as temporary employees. We found that:

- A police recruit with no police experience and little or no training is paid the same rate as that received by a person who has completed the Department's training program, assumed the full responsibilities of a police officer and acquired up to one year of experience.
- The fringe benefits received by police recruits during their training period are the same as the fringe benefits received by permanent miscellaneous civil service employees.
- Providing a lower level of pay to police recruits than to police officers who have finished their police training is an established practice in the Los Angeles, Sacramento and San Diego police departments. The pay differentials for these three departments range from 10% to 30% below the level for regular police officers.
- Paying police recruits at a lower level than the level provided for regular police officers would provide San Francisco with minimum one-time savings of \$367,000 and minimum annual savings of \$73,900 based on current salary levels and hiring patterns.
- By hiring police recruits as temporary employees and thereby saving the cost of fringe benefits for these employees during their training period, the City could save approximately \$200,000 annually based on current salary levels.

Based on these findings, we are making the following recommendations:

- That a separate classification for police recruits be created for the Police Department and that the pay for this classification be set at a level at least ten percent below the pay rate for entry-level police officers.
- That police recruits be hired as temporary employees until they have completed their formal police training.

6. Implementation of the 911 emergency telephone system could be achieved at a saving of approximately \$200,000 annually from current estimates by using police personnel who are on disability leave. We found that:

- The 911 emergency telephone system will provide any telephone in San Francisco with direct access to an emergency operator who would have direct links to dispatchers in the Police Department, Fire Department and Health Department.
- A consolidation of the dispatch functions of the Police Department, Fire Department and Health Department could produce substantial savings in personnel costs. However, this consolidation would require extensive planning and training.
- The Police Department estimates that fifteen additional telephone operator positions will be needed to staff the 911 emergency telephone system. The estimated cost of these additional positions is \$200,000 annually at current salary levels.

- If police officers who are on temporary disability leave from their regular police activities were used as emergency 911 operators, the cost of the additional telephone operator positions could be saved.

Based on these findings we are making the following recommendations:

- That the Police Department assign officers who are on temporary disability leave to the communications center to act as emergency 911 operators.
- That the City and County develop a consolidated emergency services dispatching operation which would eventually bring together the dispatch functions of the Police Department, Fire Department and Health Department.

7. Procedures governing the allocation and use of overtime are inadequate and result in unnecessary overtime expenditures of approximately \$306,000 annually. We found that:

- A police officer who is required to appear in court as witness is guaranteed a minimum of two hours of overtime pay regardless of the amount of time actually spent in court. The average court overtime payment is for 3.88 hours.
- A police officer who is on standby for a possible court appearance earns two hours of overtime even if not called to appear in court.
- The homicide and sex crimes units keep a pair of inspectors on-call 24 hours per day. Inspectors who are on-call are paid two hours of overtime per day regardless of whether they are called. If they are called, they are also paid overtime for the time spent on the case.
- The process of computing overtime is so time consuming that in recent months the payroll office was putting in approximately \$380 of overtime per pay period merely to process the overtime checks.

Based on these findings, we are making the following recommendations:

- That compensation for off-duty court appearances be reduced by one-half by limiting such compensation to the actual time of the court appearance.
- That compensation for court stand-by and on-call investigative duty be paid at one-fifth of the regular overtime rate.
- That requests for overtime be made in a machine readable format in order to reduce the amount of overtime required to process these requests.
- That the standard watch for investigative personnel be made more flexible so as to allow for arrests to be made during normal working hours rather than on an overtime basis.

8. The use of Extended work week (EWW) allocations by the SFPD is ineffective and lacks a specific objective. We found that the formula by which the SFPD allocates EWW is not based on the Police Chief's principal objective, which is to minimize the average response time to calls for police services, or on any other objective.

Based on this finding, we recommend that the SFPD revise its use of EWW allocations so that these allocations will be targeted to the achievement of a specific objective such as the minimization of response time to calls for police services.

9. The current policy and practice regarding vacation leave results in a significant decrease in police availability during the summer vacation period. We found that:

- District stations are given considerable flexibility in the assignment of vacation leave.
- Vacation leave is not coordinated with compensatory leave, disability leave, sick leave and assignment to other duties on a temporary basis.
- There is a large drop in the available police strength at some district stations during peak vacation periods.
- At three district stations during the summer the actual number of patrol officers was less than 40% of the assigned number of patrol officers during the day watch.

Based on these findings, we recommend that the SFPD establish a maximum percentage, by unit and watch, of assigned positions that can be off-duty at any one time for any reason including regular vacations, intermittent vacations, compensatory time off, disability leave, sick leave and redeployment to other stations.

10. Investigations by the police department of complaints against department personnel are costly and time-consuming, and productivity of investigative personnel is low. By raising productivity standards for existing investigative staff, a more effective use of police personnel would be realized. We found that:

- The SFPD Internal Affairs Division (IAD), which has the responsibility for conducting investigations of complaints against department personnel, has a staff of 20 and an annual cost of approximately \$1 million.
- The IAD has an objective of completing all investigations within 30 days. However, this objective is met in less than 25% of the cases investigated, and the average time required to complete an investigation is 93 days.
- In 1977, less than one case per week per investigator was completed by the IAD. Productivity has fallen since that time to approximately three investigations per month per investigator.
- The IAD investigates approximately one-third of the complaints against SFPD personnel. The remaining two-thirds of the complaints are investigated by district station personnel.
- Less than 10% of all complaints against SFPD personnel are sustained.
- Comparative data from other jurisdictions indicate that complaints against SFPD personnel are relatively numerous and the productivity of the personnel investigating these complaints in other police departments is higher than the productivity of SFPD personnel.

Based on these findings we are making the following recommendations:

- That the SFPD establish higher productivity standards for performance of internal investigations and closely monitor the performance of these investigations.
- That the SFPD place greater emphasis on minimizing complaints against Department personnel through human relations training and improved relations with citizens in order to reduce the overall level of complaints.

The administration of the SFPD and the members of the Police Commission have had the opportunity to review the findings and recommendations included in this report. Their written response to this report is attached beginning on page 59. We wish to thank the administration of the San Francisco Police Department and personnel throughout the Department for cooperating with our efforts on this management audit. In general, we found persons at all levels of the Department to be open, cooperative and interested in improving police services in San Francisco. Without their assistance, our task would have been extremely difficult.

INTRODUCTION

Pursuant to a motion adopted by the San Francisco Board of Supervisors, we have conducted a management audit of the San Francisco Police Department (SFPD). In conducting this management audit, we made use of a wide variety of informational sources. We reviewed the existing literature on the organization and operation of police departments in large metropolitan areas. We interviewed key personnel in other Bay Area police departments which operate under conditions similar to those in San Francisco. We analyzed previous studies which have been made of the San Francisco Police Department and appropriate sections of the San Francisco Charter. We reviewed Rules and Procedures adopted by the Police Commission and General Orders issued by the Chief of Police. We interviewed personnel at all levels and in all operating units of the San Francisco Police Department. We rode in patrol cars throughout the City and simulated various aspects of police work where appropriate. Many of our findings, conclusions and recommendations are consistent with those of other studies which have been made of the San Francisco Police Department. However, these consistencies, where they exist, are the product of our independent investigation rather than any preconceived notion of how the San Francisco Police Department should be organized and operated.

The San Francisco Police Department functions pursuant to Article III, Chapter Five, Part Four of the San Francisco Charter. Charter sections provide for the organization of the Police Department, special powers of the Chief of Police, uniformed ranks within the Police Department, executive positions within the Police Department, the appointment of Inspectors, appointment and qualifications of Patrol Special Officers, Traffic regulations, special police funds for general investigations and the authority of the Board of Supervisors over any change in the number or location of district police stations.

Under the Charter, a Police Commission, consisting of five members appointed to a 4-year term by the Mayor, has the duty to organize and manage the Police Department. The Police Commission appoints the Chief of Police who serves at the pleasure of the Commission. The Police Commission has the power to create uniformed ranks in the Police Department beyond those which are established in the Charter. Subject to the budgetary and personnel provisions of the Charter, the Police Commission has complete responsibility for the operation of the Police Department.

Currently, the San Francisco Police Department is organized into four separate bureaus, each of which is headed by a Deputy Chief who reports to the Chief of Police. The four bureaus are (1) Field Operations, which includes the patrol and traffic divisions and the Crime Specific Task Force, (2) Investigations, (3) Support Services, and (4) Administration. In addition to these four bureaus, there are two sections (Intelligence and Internal Affairs) and a division (Crime Prevention/Education) which report directly to the Chief of Police (see Attachment I which illustrates the organization of the Police Department).

San Francisco is divided into nine police districts. Each district has a separate police station which is under the responsibility of a Police Captain. The Captains of the district stations report to the Deputy Chief of the Field Operations Bureau. In some respects, however, the district stations operate as separate police departments. Within the framework of general and specific orders from the Police Chief and the Deputy Chief in charge of Field Operations, the Captains of the district stations determine the specific assignments of their station personnel and effective patrol beat coverage. Although the dispatch of patrol officers in response to calls for police service is centralized at the Hall of Justice, assignments are made within district boundaries and district station supervisory personnel can over-ride central dispatch orders.

In addition to the patrol services provided by the district stations, there are two centralized divisions which provide police services city-wide. These two divisions are the Traffic Division, which has primary responsibility for enforcing all traffic and parking regulations, and the Crime-Specific Division (CSTF) which is a flexible unit operating in high crime areas of the City in response to identifiable crime patterns. The Investigations, Support Services and Administration Bureaus, as well as the Intelligence and Internal Affairs Sections, also operate on a City-wide basis and are centralized at the Hall of Justice.

In the 1979-80 fiscal year, the San Francisco Police Department has an authorized staffing level of 2,424 positions including 1,770 sworn police officer positions and 654 non-sworn "civilian" positions. The actual number of filled positions is much less than the number of authorized positions, however. As of January, 1980, the number of filled sworn police officer positions was 1,616 and the number of filled non-sworn positions was 564, for a total of 2,180 filled positions. The discrepancy between the number of positions filled and authorized can be attributed primarily to recruiting and training delays (sworn positions) resulting from a hiring discrimination suit against the City and a decision by the previous Chief of Police to delay the implementation of the program designed to replace sworn officers performing administrative and clerical duties with non-sworn positions. This replacement program was designed to free additional sworn police officers for patrol duty. However, the settlement of the hiring discrimination suit has obligated the City to authorize and fund an additional 201 sworn positions for the Police Department at the same time that the City is faced with substantial program reductions in other departments due to revenue limits resulting from the passage of Proposition 13 in 1978. Therefore, the Police Department has temporarily suspended hiring for new non-sworn positions where the functions to be assigned to those positions are currently being performed by police officers.

A nationwide survey of police practices in 50 metropolitan police departments shows that the San Francisco Police Department has a relatively high cost per capita, a relatively high number of authorized police positions per capita,* a relatively high salary structure, relatively high retirement benefits, below average fringe benefits (other than retirement), relatively short time-in-service requirements for promotion eligibility, and a relatively high proportion of non-sworn positions compared to police officer positions. From this survey it appears that police services in San Francisco are relatively expensive when compared to the cost of such services in cities of a comparable size. However, on such measures as response time to calls for police services, arrest rates and clearance rates for reported crimes, the San Francisco Police Department does not demonstrate better performance than other comparable police departments. This management audit of the SFPD focuses on ways to improve police services in San Francisco while decreasing the cost of those services.

Part I of this management audit, issued in March, 1979, focused primarily on the patrol function. This second part (Part II) of the management audit report focuses on the investigative and traffic control functions, the internal affairs bureau and administrative procedures for deployment of personnel. As was the case with Part I of this management audit report, we have found in this second phase (Part II) significant areas where the efficiency of police services can be improved at a substantial savings to the City. Some of these improvements would require restructuring the Police Department and a reassignment of some police responsibilities to other departments. Some of these improvements would require Charter amendments. Some of these improvements would affect working conditions of police officers and therefore would require negotiation through the meet and confer process. Some of these changes would require a modification in the consent decree which settled the discrimination suit which was filed against the City because of personnel practices in the San Francisco Police Department. All of these recommended improvements would provide for more efficient and effective police services in San Francisco.

In Part I of this management audit report we recommended that the nine police districts currently existing in San Francisco be consolidated into three districts. We continue to believe that such a consolidation would improve police response time to calls for police services, increase the number of police officers who would be available for patrol duty and reduce the overall cost of police services. The recommendations which we are making in Part II of this management audit are consistent with the recommendation for consolidation. However, we recognize that consolidation is a sensitive issue. Therefore, many of the recommendations that we are making in this report (Part II) could also be implemented while retaining the existing nine police districts.

* Corrected for current population and authorized position levels.

In this report (Part II), we are suggesting that certain investigative responsibilities now assigned to the Police Department be delegated to the District Attorney's Office. Transferring functions away from the Police Department would reduce the need for police officer positions since some of the functions now performed by police officers would be performed by employees of the District Attorney. Given this reduced need for police officer positions, we are recommending that the City Attorney seek a modification of the consent decree which requires San Francisco to hire and maintain 1,971 police officer positions. If such a modification is not possible, the efficiencies and savings which are available as a result of transferring certain functions from the Police Department to the District Attorney's Office would still be available for the 1984-85 fiscal year when the requirement to maintain 1,971 Police Officers expires.

In the sections which follow, we have made recommendations which would alter procedures now in use by the Police Department for conducting investigations, controlling traffic, classifying and paying police trainees, staffing the emergency communications center, allocating overtime and vacation leave and conducting investigations of complaints against police department personnel. Implementation of these recommendations would improve the provision of police services, save approximately \$2.1 million annually plus a one-time saving of at least \$367,000 from the current cost of police services, and provide additional revenues to the City and County of approximately \$1.6 million annually. The net financial benefit to the City and County as a result of the implementation of these recommendations would be approximately \$3.7 million annually plus a one-time saving of at least \$367,000. Our working papers, which provide documentation for all of our findings and recommendations, are available for inspection by all interested parties.

This management audit report is being issued at a pivotal time for the San Francisco Police Department. The Mayor has appointed a new Chief of Police who has, in turn, replaced all of the Deputy Police Chiefs and Commanders. As yet, however, the new Chief has made no commitments on the major issues raised in this report or in our previous (Part I) report. We believe that the implementation of the recommendations contained in these two reports would strengthen the Police Department, improve police services in San Francisco and provide substantial savings to San Francisco taxpayers. We therefore urge their careful consideration by the San Francisco Board of Supervisors, the Police Commission and the new police administration.

We wish to thank the administration of the San Francisco Police Department and personnel throughout the Department for cooperating with our efforts on this management audit. In general, we found persons at all levels of the Department to be open, cooperative and willing to help. Without their assistance, our task would have been extremely difficult.

THE ASSIGNMENT AND USE OF INVESTIGATIVE PERSONNEL IS COSTLY AND INEFFICIENT. BY TRANSFERRING SOME INVESTIGATIVE WORK FROM THE POLICE DEPARTMENT TO THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE AND BY REALLOCATING INVESTIGATIVE RESPONSIBILITIES WITHIN THE POLICE DEPARTMENT, CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS WOULD BE MORE EFFICIENT AND A SAVINGS OF APPROXIMATELY \$1.3 MILLION ANNUALLY COULD BE REALIZED.

THE ROLE OF INVESTIGATION

The investigation of a crime involves both preliminary and follow-up investigations. The preliminary investigation is the responsibility of the Police Officer responding to the scene of a crime and includes the inspection of the crime scene as well as interviews with victims and witnesses. Follow-up investigation involves the traditional activities of the detective such as evidence analysis, interviewing victims and witness and tracking down suspects. Follow-up investigations are conducted by Police Inspectors and District Attorney Investigators.

The Police Department's investigative staff is located in the Bureau of Investigations which has the following sworn police officer positions assigned to it:

1	Deputy Chief
3	Captains
13	Lieutenants
142	Inspectors
45	Assistant Inspectors
<u>18</u>	Police Officers
<u>222</u>	Total Positions Assigned

The District Attorney's office has a special investigative unit which, during the past year, has been under the supervision of an Inspector on loan from the Police Department. The District Attorney's investigative unit has the following authorized staff:

1	Chief Investigator
7	Senior Investigators
<u>17</u>	Investigators
<u>25</u>	Total positions Authorized

As can be seen from the above summary, the Police Department has the bulk of investigative personnel.

In the SFPD, appointments to the Investigations Bureau are made at the Assistant Inspector level as a result of a written and oral examination process. This process is specified in Charter Section 3.534. Any Sergeant, Patrol Officer, or Woman Protective Officer with at least three years of experience in the department is eligible to take the competitive examination for the rank of Assistant Inspector. This written examination covers the duties and responsibilities of the Assistant Inspector and is administered by the Civil Service Commission. In addition to the written examination, applicants must take an oral examination administered by three supervisory officers with investigative experience from other police departments. Applicants are ranked according to a score calculated on the basis of a formula. This formula gives the written examination a weight of 75%, the oral examination a weight of 20%, and seniority of service a weight of 5%. Once appointed, Assistant Inspectors serve a probationary period of six months. Promotion to the rank of Inspector is automatic after two years as an Assistant Inspector.

Besides San Francisco, only Los Angeles among major California cities has a special classification for investigative personnel. Investigations work in other cities is performed by personnel holding the rank of sergeant or police officer. Personnel in these departments do not feel that the absence of a special rank of inspector jeopardizes the quality of investigative work in their jurisdictions. Furthermore, in 1977 a survey of the SFPD by POST (Peace Officer Standards and Training Commission of the State Department of Justice) recommended the elimination of the rank of Inspector as a means of broadening promotional opportunities and rationalizing supervisory personnel transfers.¹

TRAINING FOR INVESTIGATIONS

At the present time Investigations Bureau personnel learn the Department's investigative procedures through memoranda (General Orders) and oral instruction. The Patrol Officers Manual does include a section on investigations. However, the Patrol Officers Manual describes only the procedures to be followed during preliminary investigations, which are carried out by regular Police Officers rather than Inspectors or Assistance Inspectors. Departmental policies regarding follow-up investigations, which are the responsibility of Investigations Bureau personnel, are not organized into a similar concise format. A telephone survey of other major police departments in California (Los Angeles, San Diego, San Jose) revealed that these departments have compiled such manuals.

Written instructions have been provided to all investigative units of the Police Department concerning procedures for case assignment and basic requirements for follow-up investigations. In addition, some Lieutenants have written more detailed instructions on procedures specific to the investigation of crimes assigned to their sections. These directives, however, have not been collected in a concise format. Furthermore, these memoranda do not encompass the entire range of investigative responsibilities. As a result, there is no comprehensive source of written instruction that can serve as a guide to investigations personnel.

¹ San Francisco Police Department, Management Survey. 1977 p.3-76 The Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training. State of California.

In 1977 the POST survey recommended the development of a comprehensive set of written investigative policies and procedures for the SFPD. The Department agreed with the recommendation but has yet to produce an investigations manual. At the present, responsibility for drafting a manual has been delegated to two civilian members of the Intergrated Crime Analysis Program (ICAP).

Until this year a new Assistant Inspector's formal training was limited to a one day initiation to the Bureau. Informal in-service training provided additional instruction. This year the Department initiated a training course designed for officers making the transition from patrol to investigative work. The breakdown of instruction by general subject area and time allotted to each area is given in Table I. This table also includes a comparable breakdown of the Los Angeles Police Department Investigations training course. The Los Angeles training course runs three weeks, and concludes with a final examination. In contrast, the SFPD training course runs one week and has an investigations workshop instead of an examination. In the SFPD course, instructional materials are not organized into a syllabus to which the trainees can refer. Instead, distribution of written materials is left to the discretion of the instructor.

Table I
(Hours of Instruction in Investigations)

	<u>San Francisco</u>	<u>Los Angeles</u>
Evidence, Crime Lab	8	18
Civil Liberties, Interrogations, Searches and Seizures	11	11
Department Policies	8	14
D.A. Coordination	4	15
Crime Specific	-	43
First Aid, Misc.	3	-
Examinations	6	19
Total	<u>40</u>	<u>120</u>

THE INVESTIGATIVE PROCESS

A police Inspector's responsibilities are divided primarily between investigative work and non-assigned case activities. Investigative work involves rebookings and follow-up investigation on assigned cases. A rebooking is the process in which an inspector presents the case against an arrested suspect for review by a District Attorney. In brief, a rebooking involves corroborating the arresting Police Officer's incident report through interviews with the suspect, victim, witnesses and other arresting officers. The District Attorney then decides what charges to rebook for prosecution against the suspect.

The law requires that a rebooking be performed within 48 hours after an arrest. Because of this time constraint, a rebooking takes precedence over any other work. Therefore, an inspector who is assigned a rebooking stops all other work and rebooks the suspect.

Other than rebookings, Police Inspectors work on cases assigned to them by their detail chiefs (Lieutenants). In addition, they perform non-assigned case activities, including servicing citizen complaints, taking phone calls, self-initiated investigations and non-case related paperwork.

The Police Department's time management analysis of inspectors' work patterns in three investigative details (Burglary, General Work, and Auto Theft) shows that non-assigned case activities account for 30%-50% of an inspector's worktime. Rebookings accounted for 50% or more of investigative time in these details. The remaining investigative time is spent on assigned, unsolved cases.

A recent study of criminal investigation has recommended that post-arrest investigation, (i.e. rebookings), be assigned to the prosecutor's office². Implementation of such a recommendation would have the following benefits: First, the likelihood of a successful rebooking would be increased since an investigator who works in the prosecutor's office would be more attuned to the specific needs of the prosecutor (District Attorney). Second, if police inspectors were relieved of rebooking responsibilities, they could concentrate on the investigation of unsolved crimes. Third, because of the difference in pension benefits, sizeable savings would accrue to the City through the replacement of police inspectors with investigators assigned to the District Attorney. Based on the current time spent on rebookings, if rebookings were transferred over to the District Attorney's office, the police could maintain the remaining investigative effort with approximately 70% of the current number of inspectors. Because of the difference in pension benefits paid to sworn Police Officers compared to employees of the District Attorney's Office, an estimated \$1.3 million in annual benefits costs could be saved by the City with no net reduction in personnel by transferring the rebooking function from the Police Department to the District Attorney's office and by providing the District Attorney with additional investigative personnel.³

²LEAA, The Criminal Investigation Process Volume I: Summary and Policy Implications, October 1975.

³ The number of authorized sworn Police Officer positions in the San Francisco Police Department has been established at 1,971 positions by the consent decree agreed to by the City during 1979. This requirement is in force until August 1, 1984. This consent decree settled a discrimination in hiring suit brought against the City for hiring and promotion practices in the Police Department. This number of positions was established based on an historical number of previously-authorized positions for the Police Department based on a given workload which included criminal investigations and rebookings.

Any transfer of the rebooking function from the Police Department to the District Attorney's office would only produce savings to the City if the number of Police Officer positions now assigned to the transferred function could be deleted from the 1,971 positions established for the Police Department by the consent decree. Such a deletion of positions would be reasonable since the number of positions established by the consent decree was based on the assumption of a given workload. A reduction in Police Officer positions should therefore be consistent with a reduction in police workload. However, any modification to the consent decree would require agreement by all parties or else the discrimination in hiring suit against the City could be revived. It can be anticipated that the plaintiffs who brought the suit would not support such a reduction in the number of Police Department personnel. However, the savings of approximately \$1.3 million to the City annually and the potential improvements to the investigative process which would result from a transfer of the rebooking function from the Police Department to the District Attorney's office may warrant a reconsideration of the City's position on the settlement of this issue.

The Relationship Between the Investigative and Patrol Functions

Except for the participation by investigative personnel in arrests, there is little contact between the investigative function, which is performed by Inspectors and Assistant Inspectors, and the patrol function, which is performed by Police Officers in the SFPD. The two functions are separated into distinct bureaus each administered by a Deputy Chief. Inspectors and Assistant Inspectors rarely return to patrol assignments. This situation contrasts with procedures followed by other police departments where investigative personnel are regularly given patrol assignments so that they will not lose contact with patrol responsibilities and procedures. A further advantage of assigning investigative personnel to patrol responsibilities is improved communication between these two important areas of police work. Such communication is limited in the San Francisco Police Department because the Inspectors and Assistant Inspectors are centrally located in the Hall of Justice whereas patrol personnel are assigned primarily to the nine district stations.

By more closely integrating the investigative and patrol functions, the quality of preliminary investigations would be improved. A 1975 RAND study of criminal investigations in more than 25 police agencies concluded that preliminary investigations are far more critical than follow-up investigations for producing arrests.⁴ In all departments surveyed the most important factors for successful investigations were the contributions of victims and witnesses. In most cases the initial contact with victims and witnesses is handled by patrol forces as part of the preliminary investigative process. If patrol officers could work more closely with investigative personnel, they could learn investigative techniques which would assist them in their preliminary investigations at the scene of an arrest.

CONCLUSION

The current use of investigative personnel and allocation of investigative responsibilities to and within the SFPD is inefficient and unnecessarily costly.

RECOMMENDATIONS

We recommend that:

- Post-arrest investigations (rebookings) be transferred to the District Attorney's Office. This transfer would allow for a reduction of approximately 80 investigative personnel from the Police Department with a like number of personnel added to the District Attorney's Office. Such a reduction in the SFPD could be accomplished only by altering the consent decree which has established the number of police officer positions in the SFPD at 1,971 for the next four fiscal years. We therefore also recommend that the City Attorney seek a modification of the consent decree on the basis that workload assumptions for the SFPD which provided part of the rationale for that settlement are no longer valid (due to the transfer of the rebooking function to the District Attorney's office). If such a modification is achieved, then additional investigative personnel would be needed for the District Attorney's Office. If such a modification cannot be achieved, then

⁴ -----
Greenwood and Petersilia, The Criminal Investigation Process Volume I: Summary and Policy Implications, p.vii (Rand, October 1975)

we recommend that the transfer of the investigative function to the District Attorney's Office be implemented in the 1984-85 fiscal year when the requirement to maintain 1,971 Police Officers will have expired.

- The Board of Supervisors propose a Charter Amendment which would abolish the ranks of Inspector and Assistant Inspector as specified in Charter Sections 3.531 and 3.534.
- All personnel holding the rank of Inspector be appointed as Sergeants.
- All personnel holding the rank of Assistant Inspector be appointed temporary Sergeants until they have served two years in an investigative capacity and/or as a patrol supervisor.
- All persons taking the Lieutenants examination be required to first take and pass the Sergeants examination.
- Preliminary investigations be expanded and enhanced by redeploying sergeant-inspectors to the district stations to supervise and perform preliminary investigations.
- The Police Department develop an investigations manual as recommended by POST. Timely and effective implementation of this recommendation requires that this task be assigned to personnel with investigative experience rather than to the Integrated Crime Analysis Program unit. The investigations manual developed by the San Jose Police Department provides a good model for such a manual.

SAVINGS/BENEFIT

Implementation of these recommendations would improve the efficiency of the investigative process and produce a savings to the City and County of approximately \$1.3 million annually with no net loss of investigative personnel.

THE ABSENCE OF PERFORMANCE STANDARDS FOR INVESTIGATIONS WORK BY SFPD PERSONNEL ALLOWS A WIDE RANGE OF PERFORMANCE IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS.

The Bureau of Investigations currently compiles monthly data on the performance of investigative units and individual Inspectors. Each unit files a performance report presenting data that includes the number of cases received, cases assigned, cases cleared, and arrests made. These reports also provide statistics on individual Inspectors.

Cases are assigned to the Investigations Bureau as a result of police incident reports, reports from the Department's crime analysis unit, and citizen complaints. The percentage of cases assigned to the Investigations Bureau that are actively investigated varies greatly among investigative units. Each unit uses a case screening procedure that assigns cases for investigation only when certain facts about the case are known, or when the severity of the crime warrants follow-up investigation. By focusing investigative resources in this manner, the Bureau increases its chances of a successful criminal investigation.

The critical measure of investigative performance is the percentage of cases assigned that are "cleared." A clearance results either when an arrest is made or when the identity of the suspect is known, but arrest is not possible. One arrest can produce multiple clearances if the offender is known to have been responsible for a number of crimes.

Performance measures for the Investigation Bureau are currently being developed as part of the Mayor's performance budgeting system, FIRM (Financial Information and Resource Management). Implementation of this system will require a modification of the current reporting format. Objectives will be specified as to the percentage of cases received that are assigned for investigation and the percentage of assigned cases that should be cleared. A comparison of actual performance with these objectives will provide an indication of how well each investigative detail is meeting its goals. Representatives of the FIRM office and the Investigations Bureau are working together to establish these objectives.

These performance measures are not intended to be used as standards for individual Inspectors. According to FIRM and Department personnel, the development of formal individual performance measures is not possible given the specialization of Inspectors within investigative units and the unique circumstances of each crime. However, the expectation of the FIRM project staff is that supervisory personnel will apply these measures to individual Inspectors in an informal manner.

The Budget Analyst's review of monthly activity reports for investigative details from December 1978 to May 1979 found a substantial variance in the performance of individual Inspectors. Even if one allows for differences in types of crime, the performance of individual Inspectors varies greatly. The following table provides performance data for 21 Inspectors involved in the investigation of commercial and residential burglaries and safecrackings in various parts of the City.

Table I

Investigations of Commercial and Residential Burglaries and
Safecrackings in San Francisco, December 1978 - May 1979

<u>Area*/Inspector</u>	<u>Assigned Cases</u>	<u>Arrests on Assigned Cases</u>	<u>Total Arrests</u>	<u>Clearance Rate On Cases Previously Assigned (%)</u>
Central/Northern				
Inspector A	96	4	4	54
Inspector B	45	4	4	46
Richmond				
Inspector C	93	11	21	34
Ingleside I				
Inspector D	95	9	9	39
Inspector E	100	3	4	44
Ingleside II				
Inspector F	80	3	3	27
Inspector G	89	4	6	83
Mission				
Inspector H	165	19	34	16
Inspector I	56	13	15	29
Northern (Fillmore, Pacific Heights)				
Inspector J	97	4	8	18
Inspector K	103	4	7	12
Tenderloin, Lower Northern				
Inspector L	69	8	10	68
Inspector M	93	1	4	8
Park				
Inspector N	112	54	65	121**
Inspector O	112	41	56	106**
Southern				
Inspector P	98	1	1	33
Potrero, Southeast				
Inspector Q	103	7	16	76
Inspector R	75	8	11	19
Taraval				
Inspector S	101	32	40	48
Inspector T	86	33	39	79
Floating				
Inspector U	39	13	21	33
Inspector V	36	8	22	25

*Area of assignment as of August, 1979.

**Reflects multiple clearances from single arrests.

As can be seen from this comparison, performance by individual Inspectors varies considerably even when investigations cover substantially the same type of crime. For the period reviewed, cases assigned to individual Inspectors ranged from 36 cases to 165 cases, arrests physically made by an Inspector ranged from 4 to 65, and clearance rates ranged from 7% to 120%.

The Department has taken steps, through the institution of standardized case documentation and mandatory 10-day review of case progress, to enhance management control of the investigative process. Yet, as the statistics presented above demonstrate, there is quite a wide range of performance in some sections. This range could reflect, in part, differences in the complexity and number of cases assigned to individual Inspectors. However, one would expect these factors to even out over the course of the six months sampled unless investigative work is not being distributed equally to all investigative personnel.

An argument against setting performance standards for investigations work within details is that Inspectors often specialize in the investigation of particular types of crimes. Extortion cases may be assigned to a specific Inspector, or a robbery Inspector may handle all robberies of a certain type. Such specific assignments would not preclude the establishment of performance standards. If cases are being assigned as areas of specialty, then the historical record of performance for that type of crime provides a starting point for establishing a performance standard. Reporting forms could be revised to allow Inspectors to segregate their monthly caseloads by type of crime. Over time these statistics would provide a basis for performance measures that reflect the differences in degree of difficulty in investigating various crimes.

The range of performance may be attributed in part to personnel policies in the present system. For example, not only are there no performance standards applied to individual Inspectors, it is very difficult to transfer an Inspector. Under current procedures, a Lieutenant in the Investigations Bureau who wishes to transfer an Inspector out of his detail must obtain the approval of his supervising Captain, the Deputy Chief for Investigations, and the Chief of Police. If a transfer is approved, it usually results in a move to another investigative assignment in the Investigations Bureau or the Intelligence Section. Transfers back to patrol assignments for purposes of further training or reprimand are not made. In other police departments where investigative work is performed by regular police officers and sergeants, transfer from investigations to patrol is employed both as a disciplinary measure and a means of circulating personnel. San Jose, for example, requires that an officer return to patrol before transferring from one investigative detail to another.

CONCLUSION

The absence of performance standards for Inspectors has helped create a situation in which a wide range of individual performance in criminal investigations goes unrecognized and uncorrected. This range of performance indicates that some investigative personnel are substantially underutilized and that the productivity of investigative personnel could be increased.

RECOMMENDATION

In conjunction with the FIRM project, the Department should develop individual performance standards for criminal investigations. Current performance reports should be modified to allow the collection of data required to set these standards.

SAVINGS/BENEFITS

Implementation of this recommendation will establish standards to which investigative personnel could be held accountable. Such standards should increase the effectiveness of criminal investigations in San Francisco by providing a means of measuring individual performance.

MODIFICATIONS IN THE PROCEDURES FOR TOWING IMPROPERLY PARKED AND ABANDONED VEHICLES COULD PRODUCE ADDITIONAL REVENUE TO THE CITY ESTIMATED AT APPROXIMATELY \$1.6 MILLION ANNUALLY AND CORRECT MANY OF THE PROBLEMS WHICH HAVE CHARACTERIZED TOWING PROCEDURES DURING THE PAST YEAR.

The removal of vehicles from public streets that are improperly parked, abandoned, stolen, hazardous or interrupting normal traffic flow is the responsibility of the San Francisco Police Department. Prior to December 31, 1978, towing services were provided under contract on a City-wide basis by a single firm. Because of unsatisfactory performance, this contract was not renewed.

On February 4, 1980, the Board of Supervisors adopted a resolution authorizing the Purchaser to negotiate a new contract for towing vehicles. The contracting firm would be responsible for obtaining an appropriate storage facility, providing all necessary equipment, arranging for insurance and bonding and satisfying all the City's towing requirements. These requirements are similar to the requirements of the towing contract which expired on December 31, 1978.

Before approving a return to a single towing contract under which the contractor assumes all towing responsibilities, the Board of Supervisors considered two other alternatives. One of these alternatives provided for the City to furnish and operate the area for storing towed vehicles. Under this alternative, one or more contractors would be given towing responsibilities, but the disposition of the towed vehicles would be the responsibility of the City. The second alternative provided for the City to acquire a storage site but to lease that site and all towing responsibilities to a single contractor. These two alternatives were rejected, in part, because of a reluctance to commit the City to additional administrative and financial responsibilities at a time when the City faces restricted resources.

By returning to the policy of contracting for all towing and vehicle storage services, the City is likely to continue to experience the same problems which emerged under the previous contract. These problems primarily included a lack of existing companies with proven experience in towing, storing and disposing of vehicles and the difficulty of terminating a towing/storage contract when the contractor controls the storage area. During 1979 an effort was made to include a number of smaller towing companies in the City contract, both as a means to foster competition for City towing business and to include small businesses, including minority-owned businesses, which do not have the resources to take responsibility for towing on a City-wide basis. This effort suffered, however, because the smaller firms did not have adequate storage and disposal sites for the towed vehicles and towing was effectively suspended during much of 1979.

By relying on a single firm to provide towing services on a City-wide basis, and by requiring that same firm to provide adequate storage facilities for towed vehicles, the City is placing itself in a non-competitive situation with regard to the towing contract. The Purchaser has stated that most prospective contractors in the Bay Area do not have sufficient equipment, storage facilities, personnel or experience to handle this type of contract. Furthermore, the Purchaser has stated that in order to develop any interest in a City towing contract, such a contract would need to be issued for a period of approximately five years. Such a long-term contract in a field which already lacks competition would leave the City in a vulnerable position should the contractor fail to perform adequately because the City would have few, if any, alternatives.

An alternative which has not been considered for providing towing services in San Francisco would be for the City to acquire a storage site and contract separately for (1) the towing and disposing of abandoned vehicles¹, and (2) the towing of improperly parked vehicles. By acquiring the storage site, the City would be assured of continuity in the event that a change in contractor became necessary. By contracting out the operation of the storage site, the City would not be required to assume any additional financial or administrative responsibilities. By separating the towing of abandoned vehicles from the towing of improperly parked vehicles, the City could reduce the towing traffic through San Francisco neighborhoods because neighborhood tow companies with their own limited storage facilities could be used for towing vehicles which are improperly parked and for other miscellaneous towing needs (these two categories comprise approximately 90% of all tows in a normal year). Using several companies would also foster competition for the City's tow business. The towing of abandoned vehicles would probably be best handled under a single contract. The Purchaser has found several firms which would be willing to bid on such a contract which suggests that the disposal of abandoned autos is more lucrative than towing of improperly parked vehicles. Given the availability of bidders for this contract, it might be reasonable to combine the operation of the storage facility (to which abandoned vehicles would be towed) with the towing of abandoned vehicles. In addition, this facility could be used as an overflow facility for the neighborhood towing contractors in the event that their more limited storage space becomes exhausted. (Because improperly parked vehicles are likely to be quickly reclaimed by the owners, it is not anticipated that the neighborhood towing companies would need to use this overflow space on a regular basis.)

In order to implement this alternative, a storage site which is available to the City would have to be located and acquired. Three specific sites are currently available, including the Soule Steel Building, the Herbst Land Estate and the existing site near Candlestick Park. The Soule Steel Building was approved in 1978 by the Planning Commission for conditional use as a vehicle storage facility. This site provides an enclosed paved area in the Potrero Hill neighborhood on Army Street and consists of 10.7 acres. The Herbst Land Estate, consisting of 7.3 acres, is partially occupied by the Department of Public Works and is used as a storage facility for old curbs and abutments. This parcel of land, which is City owned, is located in the Bayview/Hunters Point District. The third site is the current vehicle storage facility located near Candlestick Park. This site, which is approximately 15 acres, is owned by the State which ultimately plans to use it for a park.

¹ In order to be considered "abandoned" a vehicle must be cited by the Police Department after which the owner has 72 hours to move the cited vehicle. Vehicles which are cited and not moved within 72 hours can be considered abandoned and are subject to being towed.

All of these sites are either owned by the City or available to the City. Of these three sites, the first two are more conveniently located to the area where most abandoned vehicles are found (southeast section of the City). However, both sites have encountered neighborhood opposition. It is possible that some of this opposition could be overcome if the contractor would agree to employ neighborhood residents in the operation of the storage facility.

The State has not established a definite timetable for reclaiming the Candlestick Park site and the current towing contractor is making improvements to the facility. Because of the uncertainty of the State's plans and the location of this site, the Candlestick Park facility would seem to be the least preferable of the three sites even though it is currently in use as the City's main vehicle storage facility and even though it is the largest of the three facilities.

Towing Revenues

Under previous towing contracts, the City received revenue only from the citations issued to improperly parked vehicles. The towing fee, now established at \$30, is paid to the towing contractor. Abandoned vehicles are either sold or dismantled. If sold, the contractor can recoup expenses up to \$285 per vehicle with the remaining proceeds going to the State. If the vehicle is dismantled, proceeds from the sale of parts and scrap go to the contractor. The contractors have the rights to the City's towing business, but pay the City no fee for these rights.

The following table provides a comparison of the number of vehicles cited and towed and the revenue generated for the City for these tows during 1978 and 1979.

Cars Cited and Towed
and Revenue Generated for San Francisco in 1978-79

	<u>1978</u>	<u>1979</u>
Number of cars towed	56,688	44,573
Number of citations issued for 32a TC (towaway zones)	61,952	90,160
Number of abandoned autos towed (37a TC)	6,312	4,163
Amount of revenue generated from towed vehicles	0	0
Amount of revenue generated from 32a TC citations	\$619,520	\$2,254,000
Amount of revenue generated from abandoned vehicles	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
Total Revenue Generated	<u>\$619,520</u>	<u>\$2,254,000</u>

As can be seen from this table, revenue increased substantially in 1979 over the amount realized during 1978. This increase can be attributed to an increase in the tow-away zone parking citation from \$10 to \$25 in 1979 and to the fact that since the towing contract was suspended Parking Control Officers who normally would wait for a tow truck to tow a cited vehicle could issue more citations to improperly parked vehicles. If, under the new towing contract, the City returns to a policy of towing all cited cars, then it can be anticipated that revenue will be reduced since Parking Control Officers will once again suspend issuing citations while waiting for the arrival of a tow truck.

The City's experience with increased fines and numbers of citations while the tow contract was suspended during 1979 indicates that it is unnecessary to require the mandatory towing of all vehicles parked in towaway zones. Apparently, the increased fine and increased likelihood of receiving a citation are as effective as the threat of towing for keeping the streets clear during commute hours. Towing could be utilized on a selective basis as an added enforcement measure subject to the discretion of the Police Department. By providing some towing capability, the City would have the resources to clear particularly congested areas while at the same time maintaining the City's revenues and encouraging self-enforcement by motorists.

Under this policy of citing and selective towing, the City could increase revenues in two ways. First, the fine for parking in a towaway zone could be increased further. This increase would further increase the self-enforcement nature of the City's tow areas. Second, the City could add a surcharge to all towing fees so that the City would receive revenue for all vehicles towed. In the event that the owner reclaims the vehicle, this surcharge would be paid as a part of the towing fee. In the event that the vehicle has been abandoned, the surcharge would be paid by the towing contractor. Such a charge could be easily absorbed given that the price of scrap metal has increased by 500% since 1971 from \$10 per ton to \$60 per ton. The following table illustrates the increased revenue which could be generated for the City if the citation for parking in a towaway zone were raised by \$15 from \$25 to \$40 and if a \$5 surcharge were added to the current \$30 towing fee.

Estimated Revenue From Cars
City and Towed in San Francisco

	<u>1980-81 (Anticipated)</u>	<u>1981-82 (Anticipated)</u>
Number of cars towed	44,573	44,573
Number of citations issued for 32a TC (towaway zones)	90,160	90,160
Number of abandoned autos towed (37a TC)	4,163	4,163
Amount of revenue generated from towed vehicles	\$111,433	\$222,865
Amount of revenue generated from 32a TC citations	\$2,930,200 *	\$3,606,400
Amount of revenue generated from abandoned vehicles	<u>\$ 10,408 **</u>	<u>\$ 20,815</u>
Total revenue generated	<u>\$3,052,041</u>	<u>\$3,850,080</u>

* 6 months @ \$25 and 6 months @ \$40.

** Surcharge in effect for 6 mos.

This table is based on six months implementation of these new fine and fee schedules in 1980 and full year implementation during 1981. As can be seen, from a comparison with the table on the previous page, these new fines and fees would provide additional revenues estimated at approximately \$1.6 million annually based on the number of tows and citations issued during 1979.

CONCLUSION

The City could provide a more consistent and reliable towing service by acquiring a storage site for towed vehicles and by contracting for the operation of this site along with the towing and disposing of abandoned vehicles separately from the towing of improperly parked vehicles.

RECOMMENDATIONS

We recommend that the City take the following actions with regard to the City's towing contract:

- Acquire a suitable storage site for towed vehicles and contract out the operation of this site with the same firm that holds the contract for towing abandoned vehicles.
- Contract separately with neighborhood towing firms for the towing of improperly parked vehicles and for making miscellaneous tows.
- Authorize the Police Department to establish priorities for those towaway zones where vehicles will be towed and those areas where vehicles will receive citations only.
- Increase the fine for parking in a towaway zone from \$25 to \$40.²
- Add a \$5 surcharge, payable to the City, for all tows authorized by the City.

SAVINGS/BENEFITS

Implementation of these recommendations will improve the City's control over City-wide towing services, will foster competition among towing companies, will help to reduce congestion during commute hours and will increase City revenues by an estimated \$1.3 million annually.

² On April 2, 1980, the Municipal Court judges enacted this recommendation (see Attachment III).

A REDEPLOYMENT OF PERSONNEL CURRENTLY ASSIGNED TO THE TRAFFIC DIVISION WOULD IMPROVE THE EFFICIENCY OF TRAFFIC CONTROL AND WOULD ALLOW FOR THE REASSIGNMENT OF SWORN POLICE OFFICERS TO OTHER DUTIES.

The Traffic Division of the San Francisco Police Department has 107 sworn police officer positions and 148 civilian positions assigned to parking control duties. A breakdown of these positions is as follows:

1	Commander
2	Captains
4	Lieutenants
23	Sergeants
6	Inspectors
4	Assistant Inspectors
67	Police Officers
<u>148</u>	<u>Parking Control Officers</u>
<u>255</u>	<u>Total Positions</u>

The Traffic Division has the primary responsibility for enforcement of traffic and parking regulations. Of the 255 positions currently assigned to the Traffic Division, 214 positions are assigned to traffic patrol or parking control. Other duties assigned to the Traffic Division include accident investigation, hit and run investigation, auto towing, street surveys, and court liaison. In addition, Traffic Division personnel provide escort service for motorcades and crowd and traffic control along parade routes.

The Traffic Division has been decreased in size, particularly in the traffic enforcement area, over the past several years. For example, at one time there were more than ninety motorcycle officers with regular patrol beats throughout the City. In 1972, this number was reduced to 70 motorcycle officers and currently there are 52 authorized motorcycle officer positions. With this reduced force, the patrol beat concept has been abandoned in favor of a target approach under which squads of motorcycle officers are deployed on the basis of accident reports and neighborhood complaints. Due to vacations, sick leave and the need to provide enforcement in the evening as well as during the day, the maximum strength of motorcycle officers at any one time is approximately eighteen officers on a City-wide basis. At times, this number reportedly drops to as few as two or three officers on duty.

One result of the reduction of personnel in the Traffic Division has been to assign traffic enforcement duties to district stations. The previous Chief of Police ordered district station personnel to conduct accident investigations and to enforce violations of traffic laws. In November, 1979, over one-third of all traffic accident investigations were conducted by district station personnel. In addition, officers from district stations are deployed to control traffic during special events such as major sporting events and parades.

Even though district station personnel are taking on more traffic control responsibilities, the personnel assigned to the Traffic Division are centralized at the Hall of Justice. This centralization leads to an inefficient use of personnel in many cases. For example, Parking Control Officers have beats throughout the City. For those parking controllers who do not work in close proximity to the Hall of Justice, substantial travel time is required. (Our Part I Management Audit Report of the San Francisco Police Department noted relatively low productivity of some parking control officers during the early morning and late afternoon hours. It is possible that travel time accounts for some of this low productivity.) Also, because the parking control function is centralized, a separate administrative structure consisting of 19 sworn police officers (including 1 Captain, 2 Lieutenants, 12 Sergeants and 4 Police Officers) has been created to supervise the Parking Control Officers. If the Parking Control Officers were assigned to the district stations in closest proximity to their parking control beats, then this administrative structure would be unnecessary because the district station administrative personnel could supervise the Parking Control Officers assigned to their districts.

Another inefficiency in terms of personnel deployment in the Traffic Division can be seen in the area of accident investigation. There are five police officers assigned to this function. However, three of these officers provide back-up for other units in the Traffic Division. Therefore, only two police officers are assigned by the Traffic Division to conduct accident investigations City-wide. The work of these two officers is supplemented by the work of district station personnel and motorcycle officers who, taken together, conduct more than 85% of all accident investigations. Given the relatively small contribution of the two accident investigators to the total number of traffic accident investigations it would seem to be reasonable to assign these positions to another function and decentralize the accident investigation function further.

Thirteen police officer positions (1 Sergeant, 6 Inspectors, 4 Assistant Inspectors, and 2 Police Officers) in the Traffic Division conduct investigations of hit-and-run incidents. As already discussed in this report (see pp. 5 to 10), the investigative function can often be performed more efficiently and at less cost by the District Attorney's office once a preliminary investigation has been completed by the Police Department. Preliminary investigations of hit-and-run incidents are conducted primarily by district station personnel and, to some extent, by motorcycle officers in the Traffic Division.

The ratio of supervisory to subordinate personnel in the Traffic Division is inconsistent with the pattern for the rest of the San Francisco Police Department. The chief administrative position in the district stations is the Captain who normally is in charge of 75 - 150 police officers depending on the size of the district. By contrast, the motorcycle unit, which currently has 47 filled positions, is headed by a Captain and two Lieutenants. Also, the entire Traffic Division is headed by a Commander who is assisted by a Sergeant. If the parking control function were decentralized to the district stations, the administration of the Traffic Division would be left with 1 Commander, 2 Captains, 4 Lieutenants and 23 Sergeants to supervise 67 sworn police officers plus six Inspectors and four Assistant Inspectors. This total number of police personnel is approximately equivalent to an average size district station which would normally have 1 Captain, 3 Lieutenants and approximately 14 Sergeants. Therefore, the sworn supervisory personnel (Commander, Captains, Lieutenants, Sergeants) assigned to the Traffic Division are substantially in excess of what would normally be assigned to a district station with approximately the same number of personnel.

The new Police Chief has announced plans to add an additional 20 motorcycle officers to the Traffic Division. Even with these additional officers, the maximum strength of motorcycle officers at any one time is unlikely to exceed 25 officers. Given these relatively small numbers, a centralized motorcycle unit would appear to be a more rational use of personnel than a dispersion of motorcycle officers to the various district stations. However, as noted above, the total number of police officer positions assigned to the Traffic Division does not justify the numbers of administrative personnel assigned to that division. A possible alternative to maintaining the motorcycle unit in a separate division would be to place that unit under the administration of the Captain of Southern Station. Since Southern Station and the Traffic Division are both located at the Hall of Justice, this administrative transfer would have minimal impact on the duties and responsibilities of motorcycle unit personnel and would eliminate the need for a separate supervisory structure for this unit.

CONCLUSION

The current deployment of personnel in the Traffic Division is inefficient and contributes to an inconsistent pattern for the assignment of supervisory personnel in the Department.

RECOMMENDATIONS

We recommend that the Police Department take the following actions:

- Assign all Parking Control Officers to the district station with the closest proximity to their parking control beats. Supervision of these personnel would be provided by existing district station personnel.
- Eliminate the accident investigation unit in the Traffic Division and assign district station personnel to perform these investigations.
- Place the motorcycle unit and the Special Duty Squad under the supervision of the Captain of the Crime Specific Task Force (located at the Hall of Justice).
- Transfer the Hit-and-Run investigative function to the District Attorney's office for rebookings in accordance with the recommendations made in the first section of this report and to the Investigations Bureau in cases where no arrest has been made.
- Eliminate two Captain positions which would no longer be necessary due to this proposed redeployment of personnel. (Under the settlement of the discrimination in hiring suit brought against the City, these eliminated positions would have to be replaced by police officer positions since the total number of sworn officer positions is currently fixed by that settlement unless the settlement can be renegotiated due to reduced police responsibility.)
- Assign the Commander position which currently heads the Traffic Division to an administrative function, reporting directly to the Deputy Chief of the Field Operations Bureau.

- Reassign 23 sworn officers (2 Lieutenants, 13 Sergeants, 8 Police Officers) to other duties in the Police Department. Such duties could include the Crime Specific Task Force, MUNI security or increased patrol.

SAVINGS/BENEFITS

Implementation of these recommendations would improve the efficiency of police services by improving the deployment of existing personnel, would provide an additional 23 police officers for needed police work, and would provide a savings of approximately \$50,000 annually due to the replacement of two Captain positions with two Police Officer positions.

BY CHANGING THE RATE OF PAY FOR POLICE RECRUITS TO CONFORM WITH RATES OF PAY PROVIDED BY OTHER POLICE DEPARTMENTS, THE CITY AND COUNTY COULD REALIZE AN ANNUAL SAVINGS OF AT LEAST \$73,900 AND A ONE-TIME SAVINGS OF AT LEAST \$367,000. FURTHER SAVINGS OF APPROXIMATELY \$200,000 ANNUALLY COULD BE REALIZED BY DESIGNATING RECRUITS AS TEMPORARY EMPLOYEES.

A police recruit in San Francisco is provided with extensive training before being assigned regular police responsibilities. This training includes eighteen weeks for classroom training in the police academy and an additional fourteen weeks of field training. During the field training period the recruit is paired with an experienced Police Officer and evaluated on a daily basis over the full range of police activities which are assigned to patrol officers. Therefore, during field training the recruit is actually functioning as a patrol officer. However, during the classroom training period, the recruit is receiving formal instruction. Actual performance as a Police Officer is not a part of this training period.

Currently, Police Officers in San Francisco are paid according to a four-step range based on years of service. This range extends from \$726 biweekly for a Police Officer with less than one year of service to \$841 biweekly for a Police Officer with four or more years of service. These biweekly rates of pay provide a range of \$18,949 to \$21,950 on an annual basis.

The police recruit is paid at the first step of this salary range. Thus, the police recruit with no police experience and little or no training is paid the same rate as that received by a person who has completed the Department's training program, assumed the full responsibilities of a Police Officer and acquired up to one year of experience. The only distinction which is made between the compensation provided the police recruit and regular Police Officers with less than one year of experience in the Department is in the provision of fringe benefits. Police recruits receive the fringe benefits provided to other miscellaneous employees until they complete the classroom training provided to new recruits. The difference between these benefits and the higher benefits received by regular Police Officers is \$242.05 per pay period or \$2,178.45 over the eighteen week training period.

The Budget Analyst surveyed other major urban police departments in California in order to determine whether other departments also pay police recruits the same salary as that paid to regular police officers. The survey approach was used because the Charter provides that the pay for San Francisco police officers be based on a survey of comparable wages for comparable duties in other major police departments. The departments surveyed included Long Beach, Los Angeles, Oakland, Sacramento, San Diego and San Jose. The results of this survey can be summarized as follows:

<u>Department Surveyed</u>	<u>Recruit Pay as a % of Beginning Police Officer Pay</u>
Long Beach	100
Los Angeles	90
Oakland	100
Sacramento	71
San Diego	85
San Jose	100

As can be seen from the above table, the range of pay for police recruits in the six departments surveyed is from 71% to 100% of the pay for beginning police officers. Further, these results show an even split between the departments which provide the same pay for new recruits as for beginning police officers and those departments which provide a lower level of pay for new recruits compared to that received by beginning police officers who have completed formal police training.

Even though there is no clear pattern for police recruit pay based on the departments surveyed, the survey results show that providing a lower level of pay to recruits than to police officers who have completed their police training is an established practice in at least three large police departments in California. This practice is consistent with the concept of equal pay for equal work since a police recruit undergoing formal training cannot be expected to perform the same duties as a trained police officer.

The San Francisco Police Department is currently involved in an extensive recruitment and hiring program. Over the next two years an estimated 600 new police recruits are expected to be hired. At current salary levels for Police Officers in San Francisco, the total salary cost for these 600 recruits during the formal eighteen-week training period would be approximately \$3.9 million. If San Francisco were to follow the lead of the major California cities which provide less pay for police recruits than for trained police officers, substantial savings could be realized. These savings would be partially offset by a loss in reimbursement revenue from the State because this reimbursement revenue is currently tied to salary levels. However, the reimbursement revenue covers only 50% of salary for a ten-week training period compared to full salary for the eighteen-week training period currently used by the San Francisco Police Department. Furthermore, this reimbursement may be decreased in the future since the State is considering providing reimbursement funding at a flat rate rather than at a percentage of salary. (The flat rate being considered is substantially less than the current reimbursement received based on percentage of salary.) Assuming the current State reimbursement rate for training, the following range of savings, including fringe benefit savings, could be realized over the next two years, depending on the amount of salary differential between a police recruit and a trained police officer:

	<u>Total Savings</u>	<u>Revenue Loss</u>	<u>Net Savings</u>
Pay for Police Recruits as a % of Pay for S.F. Police Officers (entry-level) based on 600 recruits			
90%	\$ 475,000	(\$108,000)	\$ 367,000
80%	\$ 950,000	(\$216,000)	\$ 734,000
70%	\$1,425,000	(\$324,000)	\$1,101,000

Once these new recruits are hired and trained, the Police Department will continue training recruits but at a reduced level. In order to maintain department strength, it is estimated that approximately 120 recruits would have to be trained annually. At current salary levels, if the same pay differential were applied to these new recruits, then the following annual savings, including fringe benefits savings and offsetting revenue loss, could be realized:

	<u>Annual Savings</u>	<u>Revenue Loss</u>	<u>Net Annual Savings</u>
Pay for Police Recruits as a % of pay for S.F. Police Officers (entry-level) based on 120 recruits			
90%	\$ 95,500	\$21,600	\$ 73,900
80%	\$191,000	\$43,200	\$147,800
70%	\$286,500	\$64,800	\$221,700

In order to realize the above savings, a change in the classification structure for the Police Department would have to be made. Currently, the Q2 classification is used for all police officer positions (not including investigative and supervisory personnel) including police recruits who are attending training sessions. As an alternative, a new classification such as "Police Trainee" could be created for the Police Department. This classification would be used for all police recruits during the time of their initial training at the police academy. Another alternative to the present classification system would be to classify police recruits as temporary employees until they complete the period of their formal training at the police academy. The primary difference between these two alternatives would be that temporary employees do not qualify for fringe benefits so that the City would save the entire cost of fringe benefits (approximately 25% of salary at current rates for miscellaneous employees) during the training period. Based on 120 recruits trained during a normal year, the savings to the City would be approximately \$200,000 at current pay levels. (If the pay for police recruits were reduced, then the fringe benefits savings would be slightly less.)

CONCLUSION

By conforming to practices currently followed by other major urban police departments in California, the City and County could realize an annual savings of at least \$73,900 and a one-time savings of at least \$367,000 by establishing a differential pay scale for police recruits. An additional savings of approximately \$200,000 annually could be realized by designating recruits as temporary employees during the period of their police training.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- We recommend that a separate classification for police recruits be created for the Police Department and that the pay for this classification be set at a level at least ten percent below the pay rate for entry-level police officers.
- We recommend that police recruits be hired as temporary employees until they have completed their formal academy training.

SAVINGS/BENEFITS

The implementation of these recommendations would provide annual savings to the City and County of at least \$273,900 annually plus a one-time savings of at least \$367,000 without any decrease in the number of police officers trained or any change in the training schedule currently planned. The creation of a pay differential between police recruits and entry-level police officers would also end the current practice of paying untrained recruits at the same rate as trained police officers.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 911 EMERGENCY TELEPHONE SYSTEM COULD BE ACHIEVED AT A SAVING OF APPROXIMATELY \$200,000 ANNUALLY FROM CURRENT ESTIMATES BY USING POLICE PERSONNEL WHO ARE ON DISABILITY LEAVE.

The 911 emergency communications system will provide any telephone in San Francisco (including pay phones without charge) with direct access to an emergency operator. Under the plan adopted by San Francisco, the emergency operators would be located in the communications center of the Police Department at the Hall of Justice. These operators would have direct links to dispatchers in the Police Department, Fire Department and Health Department. Use of the 911 emergency number will provide San Franciscans with a single, easy-to-remember access to all three emergency services and will also provide a means whereby emergency calls can bypass routine calls (e.g. calls for information) which are currently received at the existing Police Department switchboard.

The current estimate of cost for the 911 system as developed by Pacific Telephone is \$61,010 for installation and \$109,402 in service charges for annual operation. The system designed for San Francisco includes a mechanism whereby the emergency operator can automatically reach the calling party in the event of a disconnection. Other features, such as an automatic locator which would provide the emergency operator with the address and phone number of the calling party, are available but are not included in the system which has been designed for San Francisco because of their high costs.

The State of California will pay for the majority of the installation and operating costs of the 911 system. Costs of the special feature whereby the emergency operator can automatically reach the calling party in the event of a disconnection are not covered, however. Therefore, the costs to the City of the 911 system will be \$21,380 in installation charges and \$13,938 in annual service charges.

In addition to these installation and service charges, the Police Department has estimated that approximately 15 additional telephone operator positions will be needed to staff the 911 system. The annual cost of such additional positions would be approximately \$200,000 at current salary levels. This cost will not be paid by the State.

These additional personnel costs result, in part, from the fact that the Police Department, Fire Department and Health Department all maintain separate dispatching operations. The 911 communications operators, as the system is now designed, would also act as emergency dispatchers for the Police Department. However calls for fire and ambulance assistance would be transferred to the Fire and Health Departments. If these three dispatching operations were consolidated, substantial savings in personnel costs could result. Therefore, the City should begin planning for an emergency dispatching service which would consolidate the separate dispatching centers currently operated by the Police, Fire and Health Departments.

Consolidating existing dispatching operations would require retraining for dispatch personnel, equipment expenditures to bring the dispatching terminals to one location and a resolution of the question of which department would have responsibility for the consolidated dispatch function. It is likely that grants can be found to fund the training

and equipment expenditures. The question of responsibility over the consolidated dispatch function would require extensive planning and negotiation by the affected departments. The 911 system for San Francisco is currently scheduled to be operable sometime late in the 1980-81 fiscal year. It is unlikely that a consolidated dispatch system would be developed by that time.

An interim solution to the problem of providing additional operators for the 911 system would be to use Police Officers who are on temporary disability leave as emergency operators. Our previous (Part I) management audit report on the SFPD noted that an average of one hundred police officers are on temporary disability leave at any given time. We made recommendations for reducing this number by one-half by revising and enforcing physical fitness standards for sworn personnel. Even with such a reduction, however, there would still be approximately fifty Police Officers on temporary disability leave at any given time. Some of these officers are not ambulatory and therefore would not be suitable for assignment as emergency telephone operators. Others, however, are not able to perform police work but could be assigned to "light duty" desk work. Such personnel are already receiving full pay so their services would be available at no additional cost.

The communications staff of the Police Department have resisted using "light duty" officers as dispatchers. Dispatch personnel receive extensive training and there is some concern that the cost of such training would not be justifiable for police officers on temporary assignment who would then be replaced by other police officers who would need to be trained. While acknowledging the extensive training provided to dispatch personnel, much of this training covers police procedures which are part of all police recruits' normal training. The emergency operator positions could be designed so that minimal training would be required. The primary responsibilities of such a position would be to receive calls and to make appropriate referrals to dispatch personnel in the Police, Fire and Health Departments. A person who had already received training as a Police Officer could be trained for such a position in a short time and would also have information about the police department which would be unavailable to non-sworn personnel.

CONCLUSION

By using police officers who are on temporary disability leave as emergency telephone operators for the 911 system, the City and County could save approximately \$200,000 annually and have the benefit of personnel who are closely acquainted with the provision of emergency services acting as communications personnel.

RECOMMENDATION

We recommend that the City and County develop a consolidated emergency services dispatching operation which would bring together the dispatch functions of the Police, Fire and Health Departments. We further recommend that San Francisco seek grant funding for necessary training and equipment installation costs. As an interim measure, we recommend that the Police Department assign police officers on temporary disability leave to the communications center to act as emergency 911 telephone operators.

SAVINGS/BENEFITS

The implementation of these recommendations would provide annual savings of approximately \$200,000 and a more effective use of existing sworn personnel in the Police Department. In the long run, the City and County would benefit from the personnel savings which would result from the consolidation of three separate dispatch functions into one dispatching operation.

PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE
ALLOCATION AND USE OF OVERTIME
ARE INADEQUATE AND RESULT IN
UNNECESSARY OVERTIME
EXPENDITURES OF APPROXIMATELY
\$288,000 ANNUALLY.

Rules regarding extra duty are in section 5.05 of Rules and Procedures of the Police Department. Overtime is compensated by either payment on the basis of straight time or equivalent time off with pay (extra duty time). A Police Officer may accumulate up to 160 hours of extra duty time. After that limit is reached the officer must take pay. Normally, extra duty time must be used within one year after it is earned. The Chief, however, may authorize an extension of that limit for individual officers.

Extra duty is defined as duty performed on holidays, duty in excess of the normal tour of duty or in excess of 40 hours a week, off-duty court appearances, firing range qualifications and duty performed during vacations. Overtime for court appearances is based on the time elapsed between the officer's scheduled appearance and the beginning of his or her tour of duty. There is a guaranteed minimum of two hours for a court appearance and maximum of four hours.

In addition to overtime compensation the Department pays for two types of standby duty. The first is court standby. Under court standby an off-duty officer who is involved with a case on trial calls the District Attorney's office at 11:30 a.m. to see if he or she will be needed in court that day. Even if not needed in court, the officer earns two hours of compensation for making the phone call. The second type of standby duty is on-call duty for inspectors. The Homicide and Sex Crimes details each keep a pair of inspectors on-call 24 hours a day. The Department compensates an inspector who is on-call with two hours of overtime regardless of whether he or she is called out. If called, he or she is paid the two hours for being on-call plus the time spent investigating the case.

Requests for compensation for extra duty must be filed within 24 hours of the time the extra duty is performed. The request is submitted by filling out a Request for Compensation for Extra Duty card. On the card the officer records name, rank, star number, regular watch worked, span of overtime worked, and the reason for taking the overtime (e.g. arrest, investigation, court appearance). The card is signed by the commanding officer and sent to payroll. In processing the overtime requests, however, the payroll office ignores the overtime cards and computes overtime payments based on the watch reports which merely report the number of overtime hours worked and the officer's preference as to form of compensation.

Table I below presents overtime appropriations and expenditures for the last three fiscal years. The apparent decline in overtime usage in 1978-79 can be attributed to the availability of EWW money. (EWW is the abbreviation for Extended Work Week, a program designed to provide expanded police coverage through a structured allocation of overtime. See the related section in this report dealing with EWW).

<u>Fiscal Year</u>	<u>Overtime</u>		<u>EWV</u>	
	<u>Approp.</u>	<u>Exp.</u>	<u>Approp.</u>	<u>Exp.</u>
1976-77	\$755,211	\$764,153	--	--
1977-78	750,000	798,923	--	--
1978-79	779,000	677,299	\$1,160,000	\$1,123,931

Table II presents the distribution of overtime for fiscal year 1977-78.

Table II

	<u>Actual OT \$\$</u>	<u>% of total OT</u>	<u>% of Sworn Personnel*</u>
Patrol	\$212,805	26.6%	58.0%
CSTF	108,804	13.6	5.4
Traffic	21,198	2.7	7.9
Invest.	156,534	19.6	11.4
Vic/Narco	111,030	13.9	3.8
Other**	188,552	23.6	13.5

* As of May, 1979.

**Support services, Chief's Office, Planning and Research.

The Department did not compile statistics on the use of overtime for 1978-79. Under current procedures such a compilation requires an intense manual effort that the Department has decided to forego for the present.

Under present procedures the Department cannot monitor how much overtime is going to a particular purpose, station, or detail. The overtime request cards contain all the relevant data. This information, however, can only be compiled manually given present reporting procedures. The process of computing overtime for payment is so time consuming that up to September 1979 the Payroll Office was putting in approximately \$300 of overtime per pay period merely to process the overtime checks in a timely fashion. The Court Liaison section of the Warrants Bureau maintains a record of off-duty court appearances. However, the Department neglects to keep track of the total amount of overtime being used for court appearances, either for the Department as a whole, or by bureau.

The amount of overtime taken for a given purpose differs from bureau to bureau. Table III compares the use of overtime by patrol (Field Operation) and by investigations (Investigations Bureau) based on two separate samples of overtime request. For patrol, a sample was taken of 217 incidents of overtime usage during two pay periods in January 1979 for Company A (Central) and Company H (Ingleside). For investigations, the sample taken included 586 overtime requests for January, February and April 1979.

Table III
Percentage of Overtime Hours

	<u>Patrol</u>	<u>Investigations</u>
Court, court related	72.8%	17.1%
Arrest, invest.	21.2	56.9
On-call	—	11.3
Call-out	--	6.8
Tests, misc.	6.0	7.9

This table shows the large commitment of overtime expenditures which support court appearances and investigative activities.

Off-duty court appearances are the single largest reason for police overtime. Based on a review of court appearance overtime requests for the first half of 1979, the approximate cost of such overtime is \$380,000 annually. An officer is guaranteed a minimum of two hours for such an appearance regardless of the duration of his or her actual court appearance. If an officer is scheduled to appear in court more than two, but less than three hours before his or her tour of duty, he or she is entitled to three hours of overtime. If the court appearance precedes the tour of duty by more than three hours, the officer is entitled to the maximum of four hours. Based on a review of 4,643 court overtime requests for the first half of 1979, the average court overtime request is 3.88 hours. In many cases the actual time in court may be much less. Most court overtime requests report court appearance as running from 9:00 AM to 1:00 PM, although courts' morning sessions are rarely scheduled to run past noon.

In fiscal year 1977-78, the cost of overtime paid to investigative personnel for performing investigations and making arrests was approximately \$89,000. One reason for these overtime expenditures is that the normal work week for investigative personnel is Monday through Friday and the normal time of work is from 8:00 AM to 4:00 PM (Police officers, including investigative personnel, receive compensation during their meal period because they are officially on duty during that period.) Because of this work schedule, investigative work and arrests which are conducted during the evening hours or on weekends require overtime compensation if the investigative personnel are present. Such use of overtime could be reduced either by delegating arrests to on-duty patrol officers or else by providing investigative personnel with flexible working hours and days so that they could participate in such activities during their normal working hours.

The payment of overtime for on-call duty for Inspectors costs the Department \$30,000 annually. The department claims authority for this practice based on section IV-G of the Civil Service Code. This section states that standby duty should be compensated at 25 percent of their straight time rate of pay. According to Civil Service Commission staff, however, this section does not apply to the Police Department.

Compensation for court stand-by costs the City \$49,000 annually including approximately \$15,000 in cash payments for overtime, and \$34,000 in extra duty hours. These extra duty hours are taken as compensatory time off. Therefore, because of this use of overtime, the Police Department must either incur temporary vacancies in the patrol ranks or else pay additional overtime to other police officers to take the place of police officers taking compensatory time off.

CONCLUSION

Current departmental rules concerning overtime compensation have resulted in large overpayments relative to the actual service performed. Furthermore, procedures for processing overtime do not allow the Department to monitor overtime use.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Compensation for off-duty court appearances should be reduced by one-half by limiting such compensation to the actual time of the court appearance.
- Compensation for court stand-by and on-call investigative duty should be paid at one-fifth of the regular overtime rate.
- The Request for Compensation for Extra Duty Card should be changed to an IBM card format. The police officer could punch out the appropriate numbers for star number, rank, overtime hours worked, watch worked and a coded number for the reason for taking overtime. Such a format would give the Department an automated, up-to-date record of overtime use. Additionally, the processing of overtime checks would be faster and more efficient if these cards were used to calculate overtime for individual officers.
- In general, arrests should be delegated to on-duty patrol officers rather than to investigative personnel working on an overtime basis. In those cases where investigative personnel are required to make arrests, the standard watch for such personnel should be made flexible so as to allow for arrests to be made during normal working hours rather than on an overtime basis.

SAVINGS/BENEFITS

Implementation of these recommendations should produce the following savings and benefits:

- The switch to an IBM card format would provide the Department with an automated record of overtime usage. It would also facilitate the processing of overtime checks and reduce the need for overtime to process overtime. The savings is estimated, based on experience during 1978-79, at approximately \$7,500 annually.
- Halving court appearance overtime would produce savings of \$190,000 annually.
- Reduction of compensation for stand-by and on-call duty would produce savings of \$46,000 annually.
- Reducing investigative overtime by one-half would produce a savings of \$44,500 annually.

Summary:

Automate record of overtime	\$ 7,500
Reduce court appearance overtime	190,000
Reduce stand-by and on-call compensation to one-fifth of the rate for regular overtime.	46,000
Reduce investigative overtime	<u>44,500</u>
Total Savings	\$288,000

THE USE OF EXTENDED WORK WEEK (EWW) ALLOCATIONS BY THE SFPD IS INEFFECTIVE AND LACKS A SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE.

The Department was authorized an additional 100 patrol officer positions in the 1978-79 budget. However, for various reasons, such as increased resignations, the limited capacity of the Department's training program and delays in the certification of the Civil Service list, these positions were not filled. To circumvent these bottlenecks the Board of Supervisors appropriated money for the Extended Work Week (EWW) program. EWW provides additional money for overtime as a substitute for additional police officers. Through 1978-79 the City appropriated \$1.8 million for EWW, or the equivalent of approximately 100 additional police officers. Actual expenditures were \$1,123,931 for the 1978-79 fiscal year.

In the 1978-79 fiscal year the Department distributed EWW watches to the district stations without explicit controls on when these EWW watches were to be used. Although the Field Operations Bureau (FOB) issued procedures forbidding seven day work weeks and 16 hour days, such abuses did occur. Furthermore, the use of EWW watches did not correlate with the level of criminal activity. For example, more EWW watches were assigned during the day watch than the number of calls for service would appear to warrant.

EWW

In August 1979 FOB instituted a new EWW System. EWW watches were allocated to the district stations based on percentages comparable to the distribution of regular patrol forces. FOB then set authorized time slots for EWW after soliciting the district captain's recommendations as to when they would most use extra patrol officers.

This new system represents a definite improvement over the past. It allows for better management control of EWW usage and has improved the correlation between EWW watches and calls for service. However, even with this improved allocation, an examination of the patrol allocation procedures of the FOB indicates that the department has not maximized the contribution these "additional" officers could make to the delivery of police services.

Deployment of Patrol Forces

Field Operation applies what is known as a hazard formula in deploying patrol forces. In each district FOB collects data on various indices of the need for police services. These indices include the number of index crimes (homicide, rape, robbery, assault, burglary, motor vehicle theft), preventable crimes (robbery, auto theft), traffic accidents, calls for service, felony and misdemeanor bookings, citations issued, and reports made. By double-counting some offenses, such as auto theft and robbery, this procedure applies an implicit weight to these factors. FOB calculates each district's share of these crime level and workload measures and checks to see that the distribution of patrol forces between stations approximates these percentages.

The main advantage of this deployment procedure is its ease of calculation. A review of research on patrol deployment procedures, however, reveals that this hazard formula is not the most desirable method for patrol allocation. Its principal failing is

that it does not specify an objective that is being met by the allocation. Deployment methods have been developed and applied in major U.S. cities that specify an objective such as the minimization of average response times. Simulations of various patrol deployment methods have shown that the hazard approach does not minimize average response time as well as other more sophisticated approaches. These methods deploy patrol forces based on the pattern and frequency of calls for service. Computer techniques for calculating this deployment have been well-developed. The main requirement for the police department is to collect data on calls for service and apply that data to the desired formula.

The availability of "additional" officers through the EWW appropriation offers the Department an opportunity to examine other deployment methods. Redeployment of EWW watches does not involve the actual transfer of officers, but merely the reallocation of authorized overtime. The Department could use the EWW program as a means of evaluating an alternative deployment method.

Alternative deployment methods could have a variety of objectives. The objective of reducing response time to calls for police services is one such objective. The newly appointed Chief of Police has identified the minimization of average response time as a goal of his administration. Another possible objective would be the reduction of the incidence of a particular type of crime or a focus on particular types of criminals and patterns of criminal behavior. As an example of such a focus, the Police Department and the District Attorney's office both have grants for the purpose of identifying, apprehending and convicting repeat offenders in certain target crime categories. Yet another objective could be the reduction of criminal activity generally in a specific location of the City. The Mayor has repeatedly identified the Tenderloin as an area which could benefit from such an effort and the Crime Specific Task Force has been used to concentrate police presence in this area. Another possible objective could be the augmentation of a particular police function such as traffic patrol. Traffic patrol is cited here because of the substantial diminution of assigned patrol strength to the traffic division over the past several years (see the section in this report dealing with traffic patrol). The Department could reverse this trend through a concentrated deployment of EWW officers.

Depending on the objective, the deployment strategy will vary. Because the Department has not established specific objectives, the additional police presence which is available through the use of EWW has been distributed throughout the City rather than concentrated on a particular target crime or in a particular geographic area. The Department did make an initial effort in this direction when it allocated some EWW watches to increase security on Muni after a series of violent incidents on certain bus lines. The subsequent reduction in violence on Muni suggests that such specific deployment strategies can be successful.

CONCLUSION

Although the Department has strengthened management control of the EWW program, it is not using that additional manpower in the most efficient manner.

RECOMMENDATION

FOB should use the EWW program as a means of evaluating deployment methods that specify the achievement of a specific objective.

SAVINGS/BENEFITS

Implementation of this recommendation could help the Department evaluate and improve the efficiency of existing patrol services having a value in excess of \$1 million annually.

THE CURRENT POLICY AND PRACTICE REGARDING VACATION LEAVE RESULTS IN A SIGNIFICANT DECREASE IN POLICE AVAILABILITY DURING THE SUMMER VACATION PERIOD.

After one year of continuous service a police officer receives a vacation allowance of 10 working days. After five years of service the allowance increases to 15 working days, and after fifteen years to 20 working days. With the approval of the commanding officer, members may carry over part of their vacation time to the next year. No member, however, may accumulate more than 30 days of vacation time. Vacation time may be taken on an intermittent daily basis, provided that an employee with an allowance of 5 or more working days shall take at least 5 days of vacation at one time annually.

In addition to vacation time, officers may accumulate compensatory time for extra duty. The maximum accumulation is 160 hours, and "accrued extra duty shall be offset within a year after the last day of the month it was earned." This one year limit can be extended by the Chief. Use of compensatory time is subject to the approval of the commanding officer, and the fiscal office's verification that the officer has accumulated enough compensatory time to cover the period of requested leave.

Procedures for the Field Operations Bureau (Patrol)

Actual assignment of vacation periods at the district stations is done on sign-up sheets for each watch that divide the year into one week vacation periods. Officers with the most seniority on their watch have first choice of vacation periods. Reverse seniority, however, is used for compensatory time which means that Police Officers with the least seniority have first preference. The order from the Field Operations Bureau regarding vacations in 1979 stated that no more than 3 patrol officers on each watch would be allowed leave during each period. The order further stated that "the Commanding Officer is to make the final determination as to the number on leave based on the manpower needs of his unit."

Table I below presents data for each station on the percentage of available officers who were out on patrol on each watch during 8 days in July and August (Summer), 8 days in March and April (Spring), and 8 days in October and November (Fall). Net total deployment is the assigned strength of the watch after accounting for officers detailed from, and to, other companies. Actual field strength is the number of officers on a watch who are on patrol. Field strength is net of absences for all reasons, not just vacation leave.

Table I

Average Actual Field Strength as a Percentage of Net Total
Deployment by Watch

	0/8	8/16	16/24		0/8	8/16	16/24
<u>District A</u>		<u>(Central)</u>		<u>Co. F</u>	<u>(Park)</u>		
Fall	46.7	50.3	58.3	Fall	54.4	53.5	57.9
Spring	56.6	52.8	60.1	Spring	49.3	51.4	49.8
Summer	49.4	48.4	48.3	Summer	45.0	50.5	48.6
<u>District B</u>		<u>(Southern)</u>		<u>Co. G</u>	<u>(Richmond)</u>		
Fall	62.2	50.2	51.3	Fall	57.6	64.6	67.0
Spring	59.4	44.8	51.1	Spring	53.4	51.2	51.8
Summer	48.5	38.9	46.6	Summer	48.3	37.7	50.0
<u>District C</u>		<u>(Southeast)</u>		<u>Co. H</u>	<u>(Ingleside)</u>		
Fall	54.5	56.1	57.6	Fall	51.1	51.9	48.1
Spring	52.2	53.2	51.1	Spring	57.4	46.6	50.5
Summer	50.0	41.2	46.6	Summer	36.5	39.8	42.2
<u>District D</u>		<u>(Mission)</u>		<u>Co. I</u>	<u>(Taraval)</u>		
Fall	53.6	49.2	45.1	Fall	53.1	59.1	58.9
Spring	52.2	41.1	51.5	Spring	55.8	56.6	51.0
Summer	52.4	56.2	47.4	Summer	45.0	43.9	48.3
<u>District E</u>		<u>(Northern)</u>		<u>Co. K</u>	<u>(Traffic)</u>		
Fall	52.4	54.1	54.5	Fall	-	41.4	57.4
Spring	55.6	54.3	50.2	Spring	-	48.2	52.4
Summer	50.2	49.7	48.7	Summer	-	43.4	42.5

As can be seen from Table I, in some police districts there is a large drop in available field strength during peak vacation periods. For example, during the summer, the day watch at Southern, Richmond and Taraval Stations fell below 40% of assigned strength. Furthermore, for 43% of the watches sampled, seasonal fluctuations in field strength exceeded 10%.

These fluctuations in field strength are greater at some stations than at others. These differences may be traced, in part, to personnel procedures and practices in the Department which allow each district station flexibility in assigning vacation leave. As a general policy, the Field Operations Bureau sets a maximum of three patrol officers allowed on vacation leave for each watch. However, the district stations set their own vacation quotas for each watch. These allowable number of vacation absences range from 4.5 percent of average net deployment at Northern Station to 12.1 percent at Richmond Station. Also, district stations in general do not set strict controls on the use of compensatory time and intermittent vacation time. (District station Captains state that the use of compensatory time and intermittent vacation leave is subject to availability of manpower.) Only one of the nine district stations, however, sets any limit on the number of patrol officers who can be off on compensatory time. Furthermore, the use of vacation time on an intermittent daily basis often exceeds the quotas for weekly vacations established by the Field Operations Bureau.

Decreased patrol strength due to the use of compensatory time and vacation leave is exacerbated by the high number of officers on disability leave. At any given time there are approximately 100 police officers who are not available for duty because of injuries. (The problem of excessive use of disability leave is discussed in Part I of this report.) The Field Operations Bureau guidelines on vacation leave do not take disability leaves into account.

CONCLUSION

A lack of coordination of policies concerning vacation, compensatory leave, and disability leave time results in significant decreases in available field strength during peak vacation periods when compared with other periods of the year.

RECOMMENDATION

We recommend that the San Francisco Police Department set a maximum percentage, by unit and watch, of assigned positions that can be off-duty at any one time for any reason including regular vacations, intermittent vacations, compensatory time off, disability leave, sick leave and redeployment to other stations.

SAVINGS/BENEFITS

Implementation of this recommendation would provide a more even distribution throughout the year of vacation and compensatory time, and would result in greater police availability during peak vacation periods.

INVESTIGATIONS OF COMPLAINTS AGAINST DEPARTMENT PERSONNEL BY THE POLICE DEPARTMENT ARE COSTLY AND TIME-CONSUMING, AND PRODUCTIVITY OF INVESTIGATIVE PERSONNEL IS LOW. BY RAISING PRODUCTIVITY STANDARDS FOR EXISTING INVESTIGATIVE STAFF, A MORE EFFECTIVE USE OF POLICE PERSONNEL WOULD BE REALIZED.

Investigations of complaints against Police Department personnel are conducted by the Department's Internal Affairs Division (IAD) and by other units in the Department.¹ The table below shows current staffing of the IAD and associated personnel costs.

Internal Affairs Division
Current Staffing and Personnel Costs

<u>No.</u>	<u>Classification</u>	<u>Total Salaries</u>	<u>Fringe Benefits</u>	<u>Total Costs</u>
1	Q80 Captain	\$34,191	\$ 35,473	\$69,664
2	Q60 Lieutenant	58,256	60,570	118,826
12 *	Q50 Sergeant	306,000	318,828	624,828
1	Q2 Police Officer	21,950	22,932	44,882
4	Clerical Staff	53,923	17,537	71,460
<u>20</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>\$474,320</u>	<u>\$455,340</u>	<u>\$929,660</u>

* One additional Sergeant position has been allocated to the IAD; when filled, personnel costs will increase by \$52,069.

Time Required to Complete Investigations

We analyzed the amount of time required to complete the investigation reports; i.e. time elapsed from the date the case was assigned to an investigator to the date the investigation report was returned to the IAD Captain for final review prior to submittal to the Chief of Police. We were informed that the unit's objective is to complete the investigation process (including the production of a report) within 30 days from the date of assignment. However, we were also informed that the length of time required varied depending on such factors as case difficulty and the number of witness interrogations required. We found that on average, cases investigated by the IAD took 93 days to complete. The 30 day turnaround objective was achieved by the IAD in less than 25% of the cases sampled. It was not unusual to find individual cases that exceeded 200 days of investigative time.

¹ See Attachment III for a description of IAD procedures and the approach used by the Budget Analyst to review IAD performance. Department policy provides that IAD investigate the more serious charges while investigations of more routine matters and less serious charges can be assigned to other units in the Department.

In order to test the hypothesis that investigations of a more serious nature require more time to complete, we isolated investigations of excessive force complaints from all other investigations. Since excessive force is the most serious charge, it would be reasonable to expect that the amount of time required to resolve such investigations would be significantly greater than for other cases. However, we found instead that investigations of excessive force took virtually the same amount of time as all other investigations. Those conducted by the IAD required 93 days on average.

IAD Productivity

We were informed that the Internal Affairs Division was often overburdened with a heavy caseload of investigations relative to the number of sworn personnel assigned to the division. However, the 1977 POST study noted that less than one case per week per investigator was completed, that an investigation backlog of 4 months existed at the end of 1976, that the personnel cost alone averaged over \$1,200 per investigation, and that even with the substantial backlog, the unit appeared to be overstaffed. At the time of the POST study, the IAD conducted all complaint investigations (including investigations on cases which are now referred to other units in the department) with a staff of 21 sworn personnel and 4 clerical personnel. This complement completed 725 investigations in 1976 out of a total of 1,051 complaints received. In 1978, the IAD was staffed by an average of 15 sworn personnel and 4 clerical personnel. A total of 459 investigations were completed by the IAD in 1978. This comparison indicates that investigator productivity had fallen by 11% between 1976 and 1978. Overall, the investigative backlog had been reduced however (from approximately 4 months to 2.5 months) primarily due to the fact that the IAD referred 70% of the complaint investigations to other units. Less than 3 investigations per month per investigator were completed in 1978 by IAD personnel.

While complaint investigation productivity has been decreasing, the cost of personnel and operations has increased. We estimate that the IAD personnel costs per investigation have risen from the \$1,200 per investigation cited by POST in 1976 to a current level of approximately \$2,000 at 1979-80 salary rates.

Disposition of Complaint Investigations

As noted in Attachment III, the monthly summary data produced by the IAD provides no information on investigative findings by type of allegation. In analyzing a random sample of 420 cases, we found considerable variance in the disposition of an investigation depending on the type of allegation brought against Department personnel. Table I illustrates a breakdown of findings for excessive force cases only. This table indicates that of 95 excessive force cases identified in our random sample, 77 investigations had been completed and 18 were still under investigation. Of the completed investigations, none resulted in sustainment of the complaint allegation, while over 33% were 'not sustained' indicating that, although some evidence supporting the allegation was found, such evidence was not felt to be conclusive when weighed against contradicting evidence provided by Department personnel named in the complaint. The investigative results do not vary by unit. The percentage of 'sustained' and 'not sustained' findings are virtually the same for excessive force investigations conducted by both the IAD and other units.

Table I
Disposition of Excessive Force Investigations

Finding

<u>Investigated by:</u>	<u>Sustained</u>	<u>Not Sustained</u>	<u>Exonerated</u>	<u>Unfounded</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Cases Open</u>
<u>Internal Affairs Division</u>	0	18	0	35	53	68.8	16
<u>Other Units</u>	0	8	4	12	24	31.2	2
<u>Total</u>	0	26	4	47	77	100.0	18
<u>%</u>	0	33.8	5.2	61.0	100.0		

Table II provides a breakdown of dispositions for all complaint allegations not involving charges of excessive force. This table illustrates a significant difference when compared to the disposition of excessive force allegations provided in Table I. As can be seen from Table II, approximately 10% of all cases sampled (32 out of 312 cases) that did not involve excessive force resulted in findings of sustainment, but 18% of the cases investigated by the IAD (13 out of 71 cases) were sustained findings. Cases that were 'not sustained', indicating the existence of at least some supporting evidence, represented over 36% of the findings, a level slightly above that found for the case dispositions shown in Table I.

Table II
Disposition of Investigations Other Than Excessive Force Cases

<u>Investigated by:</u>	<u>Sustained</u>	<u>Not Sustained</u>	<u>Exonerated</u>	<u>Unfounded</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Open Cases</u>
<u>Internal Affairs Division</u>	13	23	3	32	71	22.8	20
<u>Other Units</u>	19	91	29	102	241	77.2	53
<u>Total</u>	32	114	32	134	312	100.0	73
<u>%</u>	10.3	36.5	10.3	42.9	100.0		

Comparison of Complaint Incidence with Other Police Departments

We surveyed major California police departments to acquire data on the level of complaints against police personnel in other jurisdictions. Of those that responded prior to completion of our review (Oakland, San Jose and Los Angeles) data for calendar year 1978 was provided while only Oakland was able to report the requested data for 1979.

The departments surveyed vary considerably in size and do not employ a common method for compiling and categorizing complaint data. In order to standardize these data for purposes of comparison, Table III presents complaints as a function of total arrest activity (complaints per thousand arrests). Inspection of this table reveals considerable variance from one jurisdiction to another. Although San Francisco has the highest absolute number of complaints, Oakland exceeds all others in complaints per thousand arrests. The 1979 data for both San Francisco and Oakland reveals little change from the previous year.

Table III
Complaints Per 1,000 Arrests

Major California Police Departments

<u>Jurisdiction</u> (1978)	<u>Total Arrests</u>	<u>Total Complaints</u>	<u>Complaints per 1,000 Arrests</u>
City/County of San Francisco	62,491	1,304	20.86
City of Oakland	29,620	764	25.80
City of San Jose	34,164	306	8.95
City of Los Angeles	201,881	1,138	5.64
(1979)			
City and County of San Francisco	60,486	1,247	20.62
City of Oakland	29,990	732	24.41

Comparative data on the disposition of internal investigations reveals a similar degree of variance. San Francisco sustained 12% of the complaints investigated in 1978. Oakland reported that 16% of all complaints resulted in some form of disciplinary action (other than an oral reprimand) and that, of the cases investigated by their Internal Affairs Division, a finding of sustainment resulted in 32.5% of the cases. San Jose was unable to provide sustainment rates, but department personnel stated that the vast majority of cases investigated did not result in a conclusive finding similar to the 'not sustained' category of disposition employed by San Francisco. Los Angeles reported that 57% of all complaints investigated were sustained. However, this higher sustainment rate may be partially explained by the fact that the Los Angeles Police Department performs observation of police officers in the performance of their duties in order to assure that department policies are being followed. As a result of this practice, many complaints against department personnel originate from within the department itself. Los Angeles reports that 90% of the complaints originating from within the department are sustained while 26% of citizens' complaints against police personnel are sustained.

Staffing levels also vary widely among the departments surveyed. Oakland's Internal Affairs unit is staffed by 1 Sergeant and 4 Police Officers. These five personnel investigated approximately one half of the complaint investigations conducted in 1978 by the Oakland Police Department. The investigative unit in San Jose is staffed by 1 Lieutenant, 2 Sergeants, 1 Police Officer, and 1 Civilian Community Relations Representative. These staff investigate virtually all complaints received by the San Jose Police Department. Los Angeles, which monitors officer performance in the field as well as reacting to citizen's complaints, assigns 2 Captains, 4 Lieutenants and 35 Sergeants to its investigative unit.

With the exception of Los Angeles, all departments surveyed present their internal investigations reports to the Chief of Police with disciplinary hearings conducted by a civilian police commission. Oakland is now in the process of establishing an independent complaint investigation unit and a separate citizens' complaint board to hear grievances against department personnel. The Oakland Internal Affairs unit will remain however and internal investigations of complaints will still be conducted. In Los Angeles, internal investigations are presented to the commanding officer of the personnel named in the complaint with a recommended disposition. If the commanding officer does not agree with the finding, the case is forwarded to the Chief of the Department and heard by a 'Board of Rights' comprised of command level personnel in the department.

Proposals to Establish a Civilian Internal Investigations Unit

In 1976 the San Francisco Bar Association and the American Civil Liberties Union developed a proposal to establish an independent, civilian staffed internal investigations unit. Described as the Office of Citizen Complaints, the proposal was approved by the Police Commission and included in the Police Department's 1977-78 budget request. The budget proposal was denied. The proposed civilian office would have resulted in significantly increased expenses and would not have been offset by a reduction in sworn personnel due to the reduced workload.

Budget Analyst staff interviewed representatives of the Bar Association and the ACLU to discuss their assessment of the need for a civilianization of the internal affairs function. The proponents of this proposal had concluded that many citizens, especially minorities, are discouraged from making and actively pursuing complaints against police personnel because they perceive little sympathy from members of the Department. Also, it has been suggested that police officer solidarity needed to perform their paramilitary and often hazardous functions effectively precludes independence when one member of the Department investigates another. Oftentimes, internal investigators would be placed in a situation where they would be investigating a past or potential superior or someone in the Department they may have to work with in the future. These factors may therefore lead to a situation where an investigator's sympathy for a member of the Department would mitigate an exhaustive investigation or an accurate finding. This contention is somewhat supported by the large number of 'not sustained' findings where an allegation can neither be proved or disproved. Commenting on the apparent low productivity and slowness evidenced in conducting internal investigations, the proponents of a civilian review stated that there was little motivation to make a timely determination on a complaint and that this attitude received tacit support throughout the Department even at command levels where little emphasis has been placed on performing such investigations in a timely manner.

A civilian investigative unit investigating complaints against police personnel would produce savings of over \$350,000 annually compared to the cost of the existing unit in the Police Department. These savings could be realized with no reduction in investigative personnel and no change in current workload. The savings would primarily result from the differential in fringe benefits paid to Police Officers and the fringe benefits paid to other classifications of City employees. Such civilian personnel could be employed by the Police Department or by some other City agency. In order to achieve these savings, however, the Police Department would be required to reduce the number of sworn personnel by twenty positions. Such a reduction could not be accomplished before the 1984-85 fiscal year unless the current consent decree agreed to by the City in settlement of the Officers for Justice discrimination in hiring suit is modified (see page 8 in this report for a discussion of this consent decree).

Several arguments have been advanced against the creation of a civilian internal investigations unit. One argument states that only Police Officers are qualified by their experience and training to evaluate the performance of other police officers in the field. A second argument states that the creation of a civilian investigations unit would be perceived as indicating a lack of confidence in police personnel and would reduce morale in the Police Department. A third argument is that any civilian investigations unit would become a focal point for anti-police sentiment and would be used to restrict the effectiveness of the Police Department. A fourth argument states that no savings would be realized from the creation of a civilian investigations unit because the Police Department would reassign but not reduce the number of sworn personnel authorized for the Department if such a civilian unit were created.

The Board of Supervisors has, in prior budget action, rejected the concept of a civilian unit to investigate complaints against police personnel. However, the Police Officers assigned the responsibility of investigating the complaints against Police Department personnel could be utilized more effectively. If the productivity of internal investigations performed by the IAD were improved from the current state of less than 3 investigations completed per month per investigator to a level between 6 and 7 completed investigations per month, there would be no need to assign investigations to field units as is now the practice with over 70% of the complaints. The elimination of this workload from the field units would effectively increase the amount of time that could be devoted to law enforcement functions. The value of this released time is conservatively estimated at over \$400,000 annually.

CONCLUSION

The Police Department's internal investigation of complaints against Department personnel is costly and cases are not completed in a timely manner. Although in comparison with other major California police departments, San Francisco appears to have a high rate of complaints in relation to the number of arrests, few serious allegations, such as use of excessive force, are sustained. Increased investigative productivity would allow for the reallocation of Police personnel currently assigned to perform such investigations, valued at approximately \$400,000 annually, to other police work.

RECOMMENDATIONS


We recommend that the San Francisco Police Department:

- Establish higher productivity standards for performance of internal investigations and closely monitor performance of these investigations.
- Place greater emphasis on minimizing complaints against Department personnel through human relations training and improved relations with citizens in order to reduce the overall level of complaints.

SAVINGS/BENEFIT

Improved investigative productivity would permit increased devotion to law enforcement functions by field unit sworn personnel valued at approximately \$400,000 annually. An effort to reduce the overall level of citizen complaints would improve community relations and permit further savings in the internal affairs function.

SAN FRANCISCO POLICE DEPARTMENT
ORGANIZATION CHART



SAN FRANCISCO POLICE DEPARTMENT EXISTING POLICE FACILITIES AND LOCATIONS



CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO - 1973

● DISTRICT STATIONS

A. Central	766 Vallejo St. (Corner Emery Lane)
B. Southern	850 Bryant St.
C. Southeast	2300 Third St.
D. Mission	1240 Valencia St.
E. Northern	841 Ellis St.
F. Park	Stanyan and Waller Sts. (Golden Gate Park)
G. Richmond	461 Sixth Ave.
H. Ingleside	Balboa Park at Sgt. John Young Lane
I. Taraval	2349 - 24th Ave.

▲ OTHER FACILITIES

1. Police Headquarters	Hall of Justice, 850 Bryant St.
2. Youth Services Bureau	2475 Greenwich St.
4. Park and Beach Unit	Crissy Field, Presidio
5. Mounted Unit	Park Station, Golden Gate Park
6. Pistol Range and K9 Training	Polo Field, Golden Gate Park
7. Candlestick Park Police Tower and Substation	John Muir Dr. & Lake Merced Blvd. Candlestick Park
8. Police Communications Tower	Christmas Tree Point, Twin Peaks



The Municipal Court
San Francisco, California

Attachment III
Page 1 of 3

BY

1980 APR -4 PM 4:03

RECEIVED
MAY 1 1980
SAN FRANCISCO

RAYMOND D. WILLIAMSON, JR.
PRESIDING JUDGE

April 4, 1980

Honorable John L. Molinari, President
Board of Supervisors
235 City Hall
San Francisco, California

Dear Supervisor Molinari:

This letter is to inform you that the Municipal Court judges adopted the attached bail schedule for traffic offenses at our meeting of April 2, 1980.

Should you have any questions regarding this action... please call me at 558-4217.

Very truly yours,

Raymond D. Williamson, Jr.
Presiding Judge

RDW/tw

Enclosure

B A I L S C H E D U L E

T 32(a)	No Stopping	\$ 40
32(b)	No Parking	20
32(c)	Overtime Parking	10
T 33.3.1	Special Truck Loading Zone	25
T 37c	Street Cleaning	10
T 38a	Red Zone	20
38c	White Zone	20
38d	Green Zone	20
38k	Blue Zone	20
T 38b.1	Yellow Zone Outside Metro Zone	20
T 58a	Grade Parking	20
T 58a	Accident	25
T 202	Meter	10
T 315a	Residential Permit Parking	20

B A I L S C H E D U L E

		<u>BAIL</u>
T 32.10	Off Street Parking Meters	\$ 10
T 54	Double Parking	20
VC 22500F	Parking on Sidewalk	20
VC 22500H	Double Parking	20
VC 22500I	Bus Zone	20

HARBOR TRAFFIC CODE

		<u>BAIL</u>
HC 20A	Overtime Parking	\$ 10
HC 22	Parking Prohibited	20
HC 23A	Red Zone	20
23B	Yellow Zone	20
23C	White Zone	20
23D	Green Zone	20
HC 25	Permit Parking	20
HC 30A	Double Parked	20
HC 81	Meter	10

Internal Affairs Division Procedures

Procedures for receiving, investigating and reporting citizens' complaints against Police Department personnel are required by section 832.5 of the California Penal Code. In the San Francisco Police Department, these procedures are spelled out by Permanent Order No. 3, issued in March of 1976. Allegations of an act of misconduct by police personnel must be accepted by any member of the Department, reported immediately to the responsible officer on duty and transmitted to the Department's Internal Affairs Division (IAD). Complaints are often received by the Internal Affairs Division itself. Citizen complaints may be received in person, by telephone or by letter. Anonymous complaints are received and investigated in the same manner as others.

Regardless of the manner in which a complaint is received by the Department, a written statement of the allegation is taken by an Internal Affairs Division investigator. Pertinent details are recorded by the investigator in order to document the complaint and initiate an investigation. A preliminary review of the allegation is conducted in order to determine the type of complaint and whether immediate action, such as suspension or a procedural change, is required. Allegations of misconduct are classified according to the following typology:

<u>Excessive Force</u> -	Force beyond that legally authorized or necessary; brutality.
<u>Unwarranted Actions</u> -	Misuse of position, threats, illegal entry, search or seizure, unlawful arrest, etc.
<u>Conduct Unbecoming an Officer</u> -	Arguments, dishonesty, intoxication, profanity, off-duty squables, conduct bringing discredit upon the Department, etc.
<u>Neglect of Duty</u> -	Action or non-action in violation of prescribed course as established by orders or manuals of the Department or order of a superior ranking officer.
<u>Miscellaneous</u> -	Types of misconduct not covered in another category.

A letter containing a transcript of the complainant's statement and the name of the IAD investigator assigned to the case is then sent to the complainant and a copy is sent to the member or members of the department who are the subject of the complaint. The investigation of the alleged misconduct is then assigned by the Captain of the Internal Affairs Division to either an IAD investigator or to the commanding officer of the unit responsible for the member of the Department alleged to have committed the act of misconduct.

There is no defined criteria for choosing to conduct the investigation within the IAD or detailing the investigation to another unit. The Captain in charge of the IAD informed us that the more serious allegations are investigated by the IAD while lesser charges are assigned to the responsible operating unit. Should a criminal charge be brought against a member of the Department, the investigation is treated as any other criminal case and forwarded to the District Attorney's office. In these cases, the IAD is not involved unless there is also an allegation of police misconduct of a non-criminal nature as part of the same complaint.

The complaint investigation generally begins with an interview of the Department member involved. Police Department personnel must answer all questions posed by the investigating officer and a non-participating observer may be present during interrogation at the discretion of the Department member. Polygraph (lie detector) examinations may be suggested, but Department personnel under investigation may decline. Non-department witnesses to the alleged misconduct may decline to be interviewed and polygraph exams are likewise optional at the choice of such witnesses.

When an investigation is completed, a report summarizing all testimony and evidence and a recommended disposition of the complaint is provided to the Captain of the Internal Affairs Division. The IAD Captain reviews the report and, if satisfied with its completeness, transmits the investigation report to the Chief of Police. Under current procedures, the Chief personally reviews all reports on complaints against Department personnel. If the Chief is not satisfied with the report it is referred back to Internal Affairs for further investigation. Subsequent action is dependent on the finding of the investigation. There are four possible findings:

- | | |
|------------------------|---|
| <u>Sustained</u> - | The investigation disclosed enough evidence to clearly prove the allegation. |
| <u>Not Sustained</u> - | The investigation failed to reveal enough evidence to clearly prove or disprove the allegation. |
| <u>Exonerated</u> - | The act which provided the basis for the complaint did occur; however, investigation revealed the act was justified, lawful and proper. |
| <u>Unfounded</u> - | The investigation conclusively proved the incident complained of did not occur; or that the individual named in the complaint was not involved. |

If an allegation is sustained, subsequent actions, at the option of the Chief of Police are:

- | | |
|-----------------------------|---|
| <u>Admonishment</u> - | A warning against a specific fault; mild reproof or reminder. An admonishment is not entered into the Department member's personnel file. |
| <u>Reprimand</u> - | Severe or formal rebuke; issued in writing and entered into Department member's personnel file. |
| <u>Chief's Suspension</u> - | Formal disciplinary action; may not exceed 10 days. |

Police Commission
Trial -

Charges filed by Chief and heard by Police Commission.
May result in commission suspension or termination.

Corrective Action -

Complaint occurred, but did not include misconduct;
corrective action may involve training, procedural or
policy changes.

In cases resulting in a written reprimand or Chief's suspension, a Department member may request a trial by the Police Commission. The Police Commission reviews all investigation reports when a finding of sustainment is made and may refer the case back for additional investigation if they do not concur. When a case resulting in a finding of not-sustained, exonerated or unfounded is forwarded by the Chief of Police, the investigation is reviewed by one member of the Police Commission (such reviews are conducted on a rotating basis) and if concurrence does not result, the case may be referred back for further investigation.

The Internal Affairs Division prepares monthly statistical summaries on the status of complaint investigations. According to the Captain in charge of the IAD, a shortage of clerical personnel has prevented the Division from producing the monthly summaries since February 1979. The following data were reported by the IAD for calendar year 1978.

Complaints Against Department Personnel, 1978

Total Complaints Against Department Personnel	1304
Cases assigned to IAD for investigation	373 (28.6%)
Cases assigned to other units for investigation	931 (71.4%)

Types of allegations:

Excessive Force	312 (23.9%)
Unwarranted Action	296 (22.7%)
Conduct Unbecoming an Officer	433 (33.2%)
Neglect of Duty	232 (17.8%)
Miscellaneous	31 (2.4%)
<u>Total</u>	<u>1,304 (100.0%)</u>

Investigative Reports Completed, 1978

Total Investigative Reports Forwarded to the Chief of Police	1252
Internal Affairs Division	459 (36.6%)
Other Units	793 (63.4%)
<u>Disposition:</u>	
Sustained	150 (12.0%)
Not Sustained	359 (28.7%)
Exonerated	118 (9.4%)
Unfounded	625 (49.9%)
<u>Total</u>	<u>1,252 (100.0%)</u>
<u>Disciplinary Actions:</u>	
Admonishment	41 (26.6%)
Reprimand	31 (20.1%)
Resignation/Termination	9 (5.8%)
Chief's Suspension	14 (9.1%)
Commission Suspension (Charges)	9 (5.8%)
Procedural or Policy Change	9 (5.8%)
Corrective Action	41 (26.6%)
<u>Total</u>	<u>154 (100.0%)</u>
Cases not completed at year's end	296

The Internal Affairs Division forwarded more reports to the Chief's office during 1978 (459) than the number of cases they accepted for investigation (373). However, the total backlog for all cases increased during 1978 by a net of 52 due to the fact that other units reported on far fewer cases than the number assigned during the year (793 cases reported versus 931 cases assigned). A total of 40.7% of all cases reported recommended a disposition of either sustained or not sustained, indicating that there existed at least some evidence that the alleged action occurred although it was clearly proven in only 12% of the investigations. For the 1979 calendar year, no statistics have been compiled, although it has been reported by the IAD that a total of 1,247 complaints were filed, a decrease of approximately 4.4% from the previous year.

The monthly statistical reports provided by the Internal Affairs Division provided insufficient detail to answer questions on productivity, turnaround time on investigations, case assignment and a distribution of findings by types of allegations. In order to acquire more detailed and current data, the Budget Analyst's staff drew a random sample of cases from the IAD's summary files. We selected a total of 420 cases for the time period of January 1978 to November 1979. This sample approximated 18% of the total cases during that time period and was of sufficient size to infer statistics within 5% accuracy at a 95% level of confidence. The sample of 420 cases represented a total of 480 separate charges against Police Department personnel since some cases involved more than one allegation.

Assignment of Cases

Table I illustrates the sample distribution of cases by type of complaint and unit assigned to the investigation. Approximately one third of the cases were assigned to the Internal Affairs Division while two thirds were referred by the IAD to the commanding officer of the unit responsible for personnel named by the allegation. Since we were informed that the cases assigned to the IAD were those of a more serious nature, it is not surprising that investigations of excessive force allegations made up the largest part of the IAD caseload (43%). However, of the total number of excessive force cases sampled, a significant proportion (27%) were assigned to units other than IAD for investigation. Since no clear guidelines exist for the assignment of cases, it was not possible to determine relative seriousness in order to distinguish between the excessive force cases investigated by the IAD as opposed to those assigned to other units.

Table I
Distribution of Cases Assigned by Investigating Units

<u>Assigned to:</u>	<u>Type of Complaints</u>						<u>Total</u>	<u>%</u>
	<u>Excessive Force</u>	<u>Unwarranted Action</u>	<u>Unbecoming an Officer</u>	<u>Neglect of Duty</u>	<u>Miscellaneous</u>			
<u>Internal Affairs Division</u>	69	33	38	20	0	160	33.3	
<u>Other Units</u>	26	110	105	73	6	320	66.7	
<u>Total</u>	95	143	143	93	6	480	100%	
<u>%</u>	19.8	29.8	29.8	19.4	1.2		100%	



POLICE DEPARTMENT
CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO
HALL OF JUSTICE
850 BRYAN STREET
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94103



ADDRESS ALL COMMUNICATIONS:
CORNELIUS P. MURPHY
CHIEF OF POLICE

May 5, 1980

OFFICE OF THE
CHIEF OF POLICE

IN REPLY, PLEASE REFER TO
OUR FILE: PR/80/571

Accountancy Corporation
1182 Market Street, Room 422
San Francisco, CA 94102

Attention: Harvey Rose


Subject: Review of the Operations of the Police
Department

Dear Mr. Rose:

In response to the recommendations made in the Review of the Operations of the San Francisco Police Department (Part II) by the Budget Analyst for the San Francisco Board of Supervisors, dated, April 1980, I am forwarding the attached. Each response has been titled to coincide with the categories as they appear in the Table of Contents of the report.

If you have any questions regarding the responses given, feel free to contact Deputy Chief James P. Shannon, at 553-1014.

Sincerely yours,


Cornelius P. Murphy
Chief of Police

CPM/nl
encl.

ASSIGNMENT AND USE OF INVESTIGATIVE PERSONNEL

FINDINGS:

The assignment and use of investigative personnel is costly and inefficient. By transferring some investigative work from the police department to the District Attorney's office and by reallocating investigative responsibilities within the police department, criminal investigations would be more efficient and a savings of approximately \$1.3 million annually could be realized.

RESPONSE:

1. Abolish ranks of Inspector and Assistant Inspector.

Sergeants are first-line supervisors. Their responsibilities include day-to-day supervision, motivation, and training of personnel as well as record-keeping for their units. Skills developed at this level of the organization are the foundation for middle and upper management of the department. Inspectors are specialists in the investigative process. Through years of experience they are able to recognize inconsistencies and trends, extract pertinent facts from seemingly unrelated data, and apply them to the identification and apprehension of suspects. The rank differentiations allow officers to pursue those areas of police work which are best suited to their interest and skills to the benefit of the department.

2. Rebookings.

The objective of the Investigations Bureau is to identify and apprehend suspects and prepare cases which will lead to their conviction. Reducing personnel levels by 80 inspectors will produce questionable savings at the expense of our stated objective, considering the City has already spent millions of dollars to train police personnel in proper investigative techniques.

Currently the department averages 35 rebookings a day; therefore we feel that the 50% estimate of time spent on rebookings is too high and that the data used was misinterpreted.* Often an arrest is preceded by a long, complex investigation. During the rebooking process inspectors meet the suspect and may gain valuable information such as the modus operandi of the criminal and his partners. This may lead to the solution of other crimes, additional arrests, or allow placement of additional charges on the suspect. An inspector might spend an entire shift preparing a case for rebooking only to find the critical witness cannot be contacted or that the District Attorney chooses not to prosecute, yet the effort might still prove productive to the inspector in other cases.

* (See comments from the Budget Analyst on the following page.)

3. Redeployment of Inspectors.

There would be no benefit to further decentralizing the investigative function. The additional duties of supervision assigned to inspectors would restrict the time necessary for the development of investigative skills. Any information gained through the centralized structure can be and is communicated down through the ranks by various media, including department training programs that emphasize preliminary investigation techniques. Additionally, most career criminals do not confine their activities to a single police district.

4. Investigations Manual.

The report states that four major California cities have investigations manuals. The San Francisco Police Department has contacted these cities and found that the manuals are primarily an aggregate of procedural orders, training bulletins and checklists. The San Francisco Police Department has the same materials; however they are not compiled into a manual format. The department is aware of the need for additional training for new inspectors and, in fact, is in the process of putting together an investigations manual as well as a field training program for inspectors.

Comment from the Budget Analyst:

Rebookings. The 50% of investigative time spent on rebookings cited in our report is based on a SFPD survey of investigative details. Not all details were included in this survey and we acknowledge that some variation may exist from detail to detail. Nonetheless, the details surveyed (Burglary, General Work, Auto Theft) are three of the largest in terms of inspectors assigned and cases handled.

PERFORMANCE STANDARDS

FINDINGS:

The absence of performance standards for investigations work by SFPD personnel allows a wide range of performance in criminal investigations.

RESPONSE:

Performance standards for the Investigations Bureau are being developed simultaneously with and as a part of the investigations manual discussed in the first recommendation. However, vastly different skills are required from unit to unit and specialty to specialty which makes this a slow, tedious procedure.

TOWING PROCEDURES

FINDINGS:

Modifications in the procedures for towing improperly parked and abandoned vehicles could produce additional revenue to the city estimated at approximately \$1.3 million annually and correct many of the problems which have characterized towing procedures during the past year.

RESPONSE:

The merits of the City owning the vehicle storage facilities have long been recognized by this department as a means of eliminating shortage of storage space for impounded vehicles. The problem that has prevented implementation of this plan is the availability of suitable property.

The Soule Steel Building and the Herbst Land Estate are unacceptable because of their vehicle storage capacities. While the budget analyst cites figures of 10.7 and 7.3 acres respectively, not all of this space is usable. We are currently utilizing 15 acres of State owned property and this is insufficient space. It is our opinion that, at the present time, there is no property within the City and County of San Francisco that would be capable of solving our storage needs while being a cost effective investment for the City.*

In the absence of a tow contract, the department has established a system which utilizes independent tow companies dispersed throughout the city to handle all towing needs. This has proved to be a satisfactory arrangement. The department has benefited through good service, and small tow companies have appreciated a share of the expansive towing business generated by the department. In fact, the current system is functioning more efficiently and satisfactorily than any of the other arrangements tried in the recent past.

The department opposes a separation of towing functions as suggested in the report. The facts as stated appear to contradict the situation as we know it and therefore request specific data and statistics showing how the statements were formulated.**

Recommendations to increase fines and impose a towing surcharge would have no impact on our operation. Towing vehicles requires extensive record-keeping by the department. Increased tow fines and a surcharge would help to offset the cost of this expensive operation.

Comments from the Budget Analyst:

* Our review of this issue with SFPD personnel indicated that this space is considerably underutilized.

** The facts cited in our report were obtained from the City Purchaser who is responsible for the towing contract(s), and with personnel in the SFPD Traffic Division.

TRAFFIC ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL

FINDINGS:

A redeployment of personnel currently assigned to the Traffic Division would improve the efficiency of traffic control and would allow for the reassignment of sworn police officers to other duties.

RESPONSE:

1. Reassignment of Parking Controllers.

Parking controller beats are prioritized based on traffic congestion and other related problems. Centralized management of parking controllers makes it easier for the department to reallocate personnel on a day-to-day basis due to manpower shortages and seasonal fluctuations (eg. Christmas shopping, tourist areas). Approximately 75% of all parking controllers are currently working in close proximity to the Hall of Justice, an area with high priority beats. Assigning these large numbers of personnel to the nearby stations would place a tremendous burden on their already overtaxed administrative and physical capacities.*

Another problem posed by decentralization of the parking control function is gasoline availability. The district stations have only one gasoline tank which dispenses the unleaded gasoline needed by patrol cars. Many three-wheel vehicles used by parking controllers require leaded gasoline which is only available at the Hall of Justice station. Any time saved travelling to the beats would be lost in travelling to obtain fuel.*

The report comments on low productivity at the beginning and end of each watch and implies that this is a result of excessive travel time. In fact there is another explanation. At the beginning of each watch there is a roll call. Then the parking controllers must obtain and prepare a vehicle for service. Next they must prepare their tag books and citations before any citations can be issued. At the end of each watch the parking controllers must return their vehicles, prepare a recap report of the citations issued, turn in their citations, and report off-duty. All of these functions are negotiated conditions of employment and would have to be performed regardless of the location of their assignment.*

2. Decentralize the accident investigation function.

The accident investigation unit should be increased and maintained as a centralized unit in order to meet our objective--quality accident investigation, court convictions and accident reduction. Ideally, accident investigation

* See comments from the Budget Analyst on the following page.

specialists should investigate all serious accidents and compile and analyze data which can then be used by solo motorcycle officers for targeted traffic enforcement.

In our experience the successful resolution of accident investigations is greatly increased when using trained specialist investigators rather than generalist patrol officers. The practice of using patrol officers and solo motorcycle officers is not cost effective in the long run and takes these officers away from their primary duties for long periods of time. Unfortunately, critical manpower shortages have forced the department to use this less than desirable allocation of personnel. It is our intent to reverse this trend as more officers become available for duty.

It is essential that a system using specialist accident investigators remain centralized for maximum efficiency in manpower deployment. In fact, the department has recently been awarded a \$2.1 million California Office of Traffic Safety grant for traffic enforcement with the agreement that the Traffic Division remain a centralized unit.** (See comment, below.)

Reassigning solo motorcycle officers to Southern Station is undesirable and impractical. Southern Station is a district station and their primary concerns are within their boundaries. Solo motorcycle officers provide a city-wide service and require such a perspective for efficient administration. Also, Southern Station cannot physically accommodate an additional unit.*** (See comment below.)

3. Transfer Hit and Run Detail to the District Attorney.

The name "Hit and Run Unit" is a misnomer. The unit handles, in addition to hit and run accidents, all other criminally related cases where motor vehicles are involved such as, felony drunk driving, all accidents involving fatalities, and driving with a revoked or suspended license. The investigation of such offenses encounters the same problems and requires similar skills as any other criminal case. Therefore, for the same reasons stated in the first recommendation, we oppose the transfer of the Hit and Run Unit to the District Attorney.

Comments from Budget Analyst:

* Our recommendation to decentralize parking control personnel referred primarily to the 25% of the Parking Control Officers who are not assigned to the downtown area. We continue to maintain that cross-town travel, twice each day per shift on a three-wheel vehicle, is an inefficient use of personnel and equipment. If some vehicles have specialized fuel needs, they should be stationed at the Hall of Justice where those needs can be met.

** We have recommended that the motorcycle unit, which is the unit affected by this grant, be retained as a centralized unit.

*** We have recommended that this unit be placed under the Crime Specific Task Force rather than Southern Station.

POLICE RECRUIT PAY

FINDINGS:

By changing the rate of pay for police recruits to conform with rates of pay provided by other police departments, the City and County could realize an annual savings of at least \$73,900 and a one-time savings of at least \$367,000. Further savings of approximately \$200,000 annually could be realized by designating recruits as temporary employees.

RESPONSE:

The San Francisco Police Department is currently involved in an enormous project of recruiting and training approximately 600 new police officers within the next two years. To attract the best candidates it is necessary to compete with other Bay Area departments by having recruit pay that is at least comparable. We support whatever recommendations made by POST (Peace Officers Standards and Training) to standardize recruit salaries throughout the state. Additionally, police recruits hired as temporary employees as recommended would be entitled to a hearing before the Police Commission prior to termination whereas permanent probationary employees can be terminated by the appointing officer. Further, recruits classified as temporary employees who already have civil service status might lose rights to City reemployment if terminated.

EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS

FINDINGS:

Implementation of the 911 emergency telephone system could be achieved at a saving of approximately \$200,000 annually from current estimates by using police personnel who are on disability leave.

RESPONSE:

An officer on disability leave may not work until a physician releases him to do so. Sometimes the officer returns to light duty status which restricts him from performing certain types of duties. The department would not object to the use of light duty personnel to operate the 911 emergency telephone system but believes the plan to do so is impractical.

It has been determined that a minimum of 15 properly trained operators will be needed to adequately staff the system. The availability of light duty personnel is minimal and fluctuates from day-to-day; officers are frequently cleared for full duty with little warning. While it is true they would require less training than civil service operators, they would certainly need some orientation before attempting the job. Using light duty personnel exclusively to staff the 911 system would necessitate constant training and result in lowered productivity and service to the community.*

The department supports the concept of a consolidated dispatch function with the Fire and Health departments (and perhaps other city agencies as well) provided we have adequate input into the planning and implementation stages of such a system.

The department also supports any efforts the City might make to obtain grant funding for staffing the 911 system and a city-wide dispatch system.

Comment from the Budget Analyst:

* The number of police officers on disability leave varies from 40 to 100 officers at any one time. Disability leave is granted for up to one year per disability provided that no light duty work is available which would be suitable for a disabled officer. The functions of a 911 operator need not require extensive training and should be suitable for all but the most severely disabled persons.

OVERTIME

FINDINGS:

Procedures governing the allocation and use of overtime are inadequate and result in unnecessary overtime expenditures of approximately \$322,000 annually.

RESPONSE:

1. Court Overtime.

The department rule that governs court overtime takes into account that prior to a court appearance an officer must collect evidence from the Property Control Section, and confer with the Assistant District Attorney handling the case. In addition, a court appearance requires that the officer travel from his normal off-duty location and activities. Two court cases, The People v. Peters and Johnson v. the Superior Court, make it essential that officers be present at preliminary hearings which account for a large percentage of court overtime. Should the officers fail to appear the entire case may be dismissed at great cost to the Police Department, the District Attorney, and the Court.

2. On-call Duty.

When homicides, rapes, robberies and serious assaults occur, there is an immediate need for a follow-up investigation by experienced personnel, as there is a direct correlation between the time it takes to start an investigation and the success rate. The proposal that inspectors be required to remain on call without compensation is in violation of the Charter and the Rules and Procedures of the department that require that any duty performed in excess of forty hours per week be compensated. If inspectors are not compensated for their time they cannot be expected to restrict their activities and remain available. The remunerations of two hours overtime for 16 hours overnight standby and six hours overtime for 64 hours weekend standby is penurious compensation for the maximum coverage provided.*

3. Court Standby.

Again, the suggestion that officers be required to remain on call without compensation is in violation of the Charter and the Rules and Procedures that require that any duty performed in excess of forty hours per week be compensated. If officers are not compensated for their time they cannot be expected to restrict their activities and remain available.

4. IBM Card Format.

Comment from the Budget Analyst:

* This recommendation has been revised to provide for reduced compensation for standby and on-call duty.

The Police Department concurs with the recommendation that extra duty cards be changed to an IBM card format. However, it is vital that there be coordination with the Controller's Office and Civil Service in order to eliminate duplication of work by payroll clerks.

5. Delegating Arrest to On-Duty Officers.

In most cases the officer responsible for the investigation is the only proper person to make the arrest. He is totally familiar with the case and most qualified to:

1. Conduct a search incident to the arrest and attach significance to items of evidence.
2. Attach significance to comments or exclamations made.
3. Make beneficial observations.
4. Interrogate the subject.
5. Preserve continuity in the investigation.
6. Take immediate action if indicated.

The police department does use flexible hours when arrests can be anticipated such as narcotic or gambling raids.

EXTENDED WORK WEEK

FINDINGS:

The use of Extended Work Week (EWW) allocations by the SFPD is ineffective and lacks a specific objective.

RESPONSE:

EWW funds are used for specific objectives. The largest portion of EWW monies is allocated to the district stations on the basis of delayed response to calls for service because of manpower shortages, and locations and times known to have high crime rates. EWW funds are also being used for "Operation S" which deploys inspectors in specific high crime areas and has resulted in 150 arrests during its first month of operation. The department is constantly monitoring EWW expenditures and, in fact, an itemized report is prepared weekly for the Chief of Police.

Comment from the Budget Analyst:

These new policies of the recently-appointed Chief of Police are consistent with our recommendations.

VACATION LEAVE POLICY

FINDINGS:

The current policy and practice regarding vacation leave results in a significant decrease in police availability during the summer vacation period.

RESPONSE:

When the statistical information was developed for this report the department was experiencing a disability factor of approximately 8% in addition to a 4-5% sick leave factor. The disability rate has since been reduced to approximately 3-1/2% and our total disability and sick leave is running approximately 6%. On the average there is approximately 1/3 of a watch off duty at any given time because of the normal days-off schedules. There are an additional 13% off for disability and sick leave. The average of watches off added to the disability and sick leave results in 46% of a watch being off duty on any given day excluding vacations.

Therefore, because of the relatively small numbers of personnel after compensating for the above facts, we question the validity of the statistical analysis used to determine manpower availability. No evidence has been presented in the report that the figures are the result of vacation scheduling rather than disability leave, sick leave, compensatory time, or normal fluctuations. We request further information including a breakdown of the raw data used to arrive at the percentages in Table I as well as the statistical tests applied to the data. Furthermore, the captain in charge of each district is certainly the person most intimate with the manpower needs of his district during various times of the year.

Comment from the Budget Analyst:

The sample used was selected in order to offer the fairest possible comparison of seasonal police officer availability. Field strength is net of absences for all reasons, not just vacation leave. The Budget Analyst is not asserting that the fluctuations in field strength are the result solely of vacation scheduling. The point is that the Department's vacation policy does not take into account other forms of absenteeism, particularly disability, sick leave and the intermittent use of other paid leave.



INTERNAL AFFAIRS

FINDINGS:

Investigations of complaints against department personnel by the Police Department are costly and time-consuming, and productivity of investigative personnel is low. By raising productivity standards for existing investigative staff, a more effective use of police personnel would be realized.

RESPONSE:

1. Establish higher productivity standards for performance of internal investigations and closely monitor performance of these investigations.

The recommendations are being studied so that we might make changes that will result in higher productivity without loss of thoroughness and impartiality.

2. Place greater emphasis on minimizing complaints against Department personnel through human relations training and improved relations with citizens in order to reduce the overall level of complaints.

The Police Academy now devotes 40 hours to sensitivity training and improving community relations.

Comment from the Budget Analyst:

Recent reports of the Budget Analyst have commented favorably on the Department's new recruit training program. We suggest efforts toward improving community relations be expanded to include all department personnel.

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